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INTRODUCTION

In its first significant pregnancy discrimination case in nearly a quarter
century, the Supreme Court issued a decision in 2015 in Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.' that cuts against the grain of entrenched employment discrimination doctrine. 2 The starting point for employment discrimination law generally
proceeds from a sharp divide between the disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories of discrimination. Disparate treatment claims are characterized by courts' requirement that plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that
the employer acted with discriminatory intent, rigid reliance on proof frameworks to frame the discriminatory inquiry, and insistence on a strict proximity
between comparators when discriminatory intent is inferred from differential
treatment. These features of employment discrimination cut across the various
protected classes enumerated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 and
the dominant federal statutes with employment discrimination protections modeled on Title VII, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 4
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Against this background, what the Court accomplished in Young appears
startling. Although styled as disparate treatment, the claim that the Court crafted
in Young under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA), blurs the boundary between disparate impact and disparate treatment,
1. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
2. The only other pregnancy discrimination case the Court has decided since its 1991 decision in United
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), which rejected the bona fide occupational
qualification defense to the company's exclusion of pregnant women from jobs with high lead exposure risks, is

AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009), a narmwer ruling finding a challenge to the lingering effects of
pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act discrimination to be time-bared under the statute.

3. 42 U.S.C.
4. 29 U.S.C.
5. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e (2012).
§§ 621-634 (2012).
§§ 12111-12117 (2012).

2017]

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

561

allowing the disparate treatment violation to rest upon proof of the unjustified
burden that the employer's accommodation policies place on pregnant women.
In setting out the elements of the claim, the Court broadened the class of
employees to which pregnant workers may compare themselves, made creative
use of the foundational pretext framework adopted by the Court in its landmark
1973 decision, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,6 and designed a claim that
is more suitable for capturing unconscious or implicit bias than one limited to
employer actions based on a deliberate intent to discriminate. Even as it veered
from the well-worn path of employment discrimination doctrine, the Court
leaned heavily on the familiar architecture of McDonnell Douglas and waved
the banner of disparate treatment.
This Article situates the Court's decision in Young against the backdrop of
employment discrimination doctrine to better understand what happened as a
somewhat novel-although not entirely unprecedented-hybrid treatment-byimpact claim. After framing Young as an outlier that stretches the doctrinal
mold, the Article considers what purpose the traditional doctrinal labels serve in
the case and defends the Court's doctrinal move as well-designed to reach the
ingrained stereotypes against pregnant workers that too often underlie employer
refusals to extend accommodations to pregnant workers. The Court's embrace
of this kind of PDA failure-to-accommodate claim corresponds to recent upticks
in public concern about the harsh treatment of employees who become pregnant
and the success of advocates for pregnant workers in broadening public understanding of what it means to unfairly discriminate on the basis of pregnancy.
The biggest unanswered question after Young is what, if any, implications this
development has for other areas of employment discrimination law. What
happened in Young does not likely forecast a more general upheaval of the
boundary separating disparate impact and disparate treatment, nor an across-theboard reversal of the trend toward requiring ever-more similar comparators. Nor
does it mark a broad reconceptualization of discriminatory intent as implicit
bias in individual disparate treatment cases. I argue that it does, however, have
the potential to usher in a more targeted shift in one particular area of discrimination law that, like PDA accommodation claims, relies on a comparator-driven
unequal treatment model and has been the subject of a reinvigorated cultural
engagement with the problem of discrimination. This Article contends that,
properly understood, the Young framework can pave the way for a more robust
equal pay claim challenging the unequal compensation paid to women and men
performing substantially similar work. In singling out the equal pay claim to
explore the implications of Young, I do not mean to foreclose the potential for
the Young framework to make further incursions in other realms of employment
discrimination law. Rather, there are two reasons why the pay claim is a
particularly auspicious place to start. First, the pregnancy accommodation and
equal pay claims both lean heavily on the different treatment of a class of
6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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comparators to prove the violation-for pregnancy, other workers with health
conditions that similarly affect their ability to work, and for pay, workers of the
other sex performing substantially similar work. Second, social movement
activism and heightened public sympathies for the workers subjected to these
discriminatory practices have created opportunities for contesting the ideologies
that support narrower interpretations of discrimination in these settings.
Over the last few decades, pay discrimination claims have floundered in the
lower courts in a pattern that replicates the courts' treatment of PDA claims
prior to Young. In recent years, however, pay discrimination has emerged as a
flashpoint for revitalized feminist advocacy and activism with the effect of
renewing public concern about the gender wage gap and challenging popular
assumptions about the prevalence of pay discrimination. At the same time,
momentum is building to add a disparate impact-like test for employer justifications of pay disparities into the overarching framework of the disparate treatment pay discrimination claim. This development has already taken root in
some lower courts and has been the focal point for legislative reform efforts to
strengthen the Equal Pay Act.
Critics of these developments charge that testing the strength of employer
justifications for pay disparities would turn a disparate treatment claim into a
disparate impact claim, leaving it unmoored from the normative justifications
for addressing pay disparities. Others question the value of an equal pay
strategy focused on limiting the defense to equal pay claims when the threshold
problem of finding close-enough comparators will likely continue to sound the
death knell for such claims before courts ever inquire into the employer's
justification for the challenged pay disparity. This Article contends that developing the theoretical justifications in support of the Young framework can ease
these concerns. The Court's moves in Young, understood against the backdrop
of employment discrimination law more broadly, can help chart a path for the
equal pay claim to find its legs.
This Article begins in Part I with a brief survey of the state of employment
discrimination law. After teasing out the architecture of the law and its supporting premises, the picture that emerges reveals an area of law bound by rigid
proof frameworks-in which the sorting of evidence into discrete categories
and shifting burdens of proof take center stage-and a sharp dichotomy separating disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Within disparate treatment,
as the empirical foundations for the proof models have weakened, the individual
disparate treatment claim has become increasingly difficult to win. Courts apply
the disparate treatment proof frameworks in search of a conception of discriminatory intent in which an individual decision maker consciously and deliberately decides to disfavor an employee because of his or her protected class
status. Using this understanding of discriminatory intent, courts require an
exceedingly close proximity between comparators in order to rule out what they
would consider more likely explanations for the adverse treatment of a plaintiff.
Although there is no separate element of the disparate treatment claim requiring
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proof of deliberate and conscious bias, this conception of discriminatory intent
shapes what courts are looking for and reduces the likelihood of finding
intentional discrimination.
Against this background, Part II explores the ways in which the Young
framework breaks from these strictures. The result is a PDA claim that is broad
enough to reach not only employer policies that burden pregnant women
because of antipregnancy animus or a deliberate desire to harm pregnant
workers, but also those policies disadvantaging pregnant workers that are based
on an implicit judgment that devalues workers on the cusp of motherhood and
places a lower value on their retention. Making the case that the latter explanation, and not the narrower animus-based understanding, best explains the prevalence of pregnancy discrimination today, this Part concludes with a defense of
the Court's grounding of the claim in the disparate treatment, as opposed to
disparate impact, category.
Part III turns to the implications of Young beyond pregnancy discrimination,
contending that the Court's central move, using unjustified impact to support a
finding of disparate treatment, provides the foundation for a parallel move in the
equal pay claim. It charts the similarities between the doctrine in pregnancy and
pay discrimination that make the pay claim amenable to this development and
points out parallels in the heightened social movement activism surrounding
both of these gender justice issues. This Part argues that, as is true for pregnancy discrimination, much of the unfavorable treatment of women stems from
implicit judgments devaluing women as workers rather than conscious decisions
to disfavor women because of their sex. Importing the Young theory of unjustified impact into the pay claim would make it a more viable tool for reaching the
kind of bias that more typically manifests as pay discrimination in the modern
workforce. The move to incorporate unjustified impact into the disparate treatment pay framework has already begun in some lower courts and is a central
feature of the primary focal point for legislative reform, the proposed Paycheck
Fairness Act. The theory of Young developed and defended in this Article
supports the parallel development that is on the cusp of taking hold in the equal
pay claim.
The Article concludes with thoughts about why, notwithstanding the malleability of the treatment and impact categories, disparate treatment provides the
preferable grounding for these developments. Doctrinal advantages aside, the
disparate treatment framing of pregnancy and pay discrimination claims best
resonates with the social movement work of contesting the ideologies at the
heart of these injustices.
I. A

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: THE TYRANNY OF
THE PROOF FRAMEWORKS AND THE JUDICIARY'S NARROW VIEW OF
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

Understanding the import of the Young decision requires some familiarity
with the doctrinal categories and proof frameworks that govern employment
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discrimination law. This Section sets the table for the dissection of Young and
the discussion of its implications that follows.
A. TRACING THE IMPACT AND TREATMENT DIVIDE AND THEIR SEPARATE
PROOF FRAMEWORKS

As anyone who teaches employment discrimination can attest, courts' reliance on rigid doctrinal categories and stultified proof frameworks have come to
occlude more than illuminate the fundamental issues of workplace discrimination. Charles Sullivan, coauthor of a leading employment discrimination casebook, has bemoaned the "judicial and scholarly obsession with formal proof
structures" that occupies the field.7 Other scholars have agreed, calling for the
law's reconstruction to escape the straitjackets that the proof frameworks impose on discrimination claims." Lower courts, too, have openly chafed under
the confines of the categories and proof frameworks. 9
The starting point for understanding the byzantine edifice of employment
discrimination law is the strict separation between the disparate treatment and
disparate impact varieties of discrimination. The architecture of the law rests on
a foundational assumption that disparate treatment and disparate impact represent entirely discrete and separate categories. Disparate treatment addresses
intentional discrimination against members of a protected class-that is, the
different treatment of persons on a statutorily prohibited basis, such as race, sex,
national origin, religion, age, or disability.1 o Disparate impact, on the other
hand, reaches facially neutral employment practices that have a disparate
impact, or disproportionate effect, on a protected class and lack a sufficient
business justification that the practice is job-related and necessary for the
employer's business.
The proof frameworks for individual disparate treatment claims are by now
well-worn and easily recited by students and practitioners alike. The classic

7. Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenixfrom the Ash: Proving Discriminationby Comparators,60 ALA.

L. REv. 191, 192 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discriminationby Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 (2011)
(describing employment discrimination law as "in the midst of a crisis of methodological and
conceptual dimensions"); Sandra F Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REv. 69,
71-72 (2011) (criticizing courts' reliance on the proof frameworks and arguing for a more streamlined
approach tied to the language of the statutes).

9. See, e.g., Paup v. Gear Prods., Inc., 327 F. App'x 100, 113 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[S]ome have
criticized McDonnell Douglas as improperly diverting attention away from the real question posed by
the ADEA-whether age discrimination actually took place-and substituting in its stead a proxy that
only imperfectly tracks that inquiry. But McDonnell Douglas of course remains binding on us."
(citations omitted)).
10. Unlike constitutional law, which accords a higher level of scrutiny to race discrimination than
sex discrimination and much less for nonsuspect classes, Title VII law does not vary in the level of
protection afforded to race, sex, or the other specified classes. The sole exception is the statute's bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, which does not apply to discrimination based on race.

See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that Title
VII analysis does not differ for race and sex discrimination, except with respect to the statute's BFOQ
defense).
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model for proving Title VII claims of individual disparate treatment requires the
plaintiff to establish four cookie-cutter elements of a prima facie case designed
to rule out the most obvious nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged
employment decision, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, at which point the burden to produce evidence shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision." With the
employer's burden satisfied, the presumption of discrimination drops out of
the case and the plaintiff has the burden at the third and final stage to prove that
the employer's proffered reason is really a pretext for the actual discriminatory
reason. 12 The Court has applied this same framework, developed in Title VII
cases, to individual disparate treatment claims for age and disability discrimination. 13 Much ink has been spilled, by judges as well as commentators, attempting to sort out what exactly a plaintiff must prove in order to get to a jury or
uphold a jury verdict under this framework. 14
More recently, another path to proving individual disparate treatment under
Title VII has emerged in which the plaintiff proves that discrimination was a
"motivating factor" for the employment decision.1 5 This establishes employer
liability, but leaves the employer with an opportunity to avoid damages and
limit injunctive relief by proving that the same decision would have been made
even without the unlawful discriminatory motive.1 6 The motivating factor framework, known as the mixed-motive model, originated in a 1989 Title VII case,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the plaintiff prevailed by proving that
the plaintiff's sex was one reason for the employment decision, even if a
nondiscriminatory reason also motivated the decision. 1 7 The model was refined
and codified by statute in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which added Section

11. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 & n.13 (1973). The four elements
that established the prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas are: (i) plaintiff is a member of a racial
minority; (ii) plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job; (iii) plaintiff was rejected despite his
qualifications; and (iv) the job remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants. Id. at 802.
These four elements are not set in stone, but are designed to be tailored to the facts of any particular
case. Id. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of
the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.").
12. Id. at 805.
13. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-55 (2003) (applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework to individual disparate treatment claims under the ADA); Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (assuming, without deciding, that the McDonnell
Douglas model is fully applicable to individual disparate treatment under the ADEA).
14. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48 (stating that courts may, "[i]n appropriate circumstances,"
conclude that a reasonable jury could infer discrimination from the plaintiff's proof of falsity of the
defendant's reason combined with proof of the prima facie case, but declining to proclaim that such
proof will "always" be sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment); see also Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58
S.M.U. L. REv. 103 (2005).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
16. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
17. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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703(m) to Title VII" Unlike the classic McDonnell Douglas model, this proof
framework is not available under the ADEA because this provision of the 1991
Act only amended Title VII.19 It is not yet clear whether this proof framework is
available for individual disparate treatment claims under the ADA. 2 0
Despite the relative ease of stating the parties' respective proof burdens under
the classic McDonnell Douglas formula and the more recent motivating factor
method, determining which of these two proof frameworks applies in any given
Title VII individual disparate treatment case, and discerning how the two
models interrelate, remains a muddled mess.2 1
Disparate impact claims under Title VII follow a different track altogether. To
establish a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff has the burden of identifying a
particular employment practice used by the employer and proving that the
practice caused a disparate impact on the plaintiff-class. 22 If the plaintiff
satisfies this burden, the employer has the burden of proving that the challenged
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 2 3 If the employer
meets its burden, the plaintiff has one more crack at winning the case by
proving that the employer refused to use an alternative practice that would have
avoided the disparate impact while still meeting the employer's business needs.24
Disparate impact claims are available for age-based impact under the ADEA,
but are not governed by the disparate impact provisions codified in the 1991
Civil Rights Act, which amended only Title VII. 2 5

18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
19. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-75, 180 (2009).
20. See Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the
motivating factor framework under the ADA); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 317
(6th Cir. 2012) (same); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)
(same). But see Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court's 2008-2009 Labor and
Employment Cases, 13 EMP. Rrs. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 253, 272-74 (2009) (arguing that Gross should not
extend to the ADA).
21. See, e.g., Rapold v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding trial
court's refusal to give a motivating factor instruction where each party contended that the adverse
employment decision was caused by a single motive); Sandra F. Sperino, Nassar's Hidden Message,
LAw PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2014/
04/nassars-hidden-message.html [https://perma.cc/YF3F-Y2DV] (contending that the McDonnell Douglas and motivating factor approaches are not alternative theories of liability, but merely different ways
of proving a violation of the statute's core ban on discrimination, such that the motivating factor
approach to proof should be available in every individual disparate treatment case under Title VII); see
generally MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIAL ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 86-90 (8th ed. 2013) (describing a dizzying array of possibilities for
piecing together, substituting, or integrating the newer "motivating factor" model and the classic
McDonnell Douglas model).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2012).
23. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
24. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).
25. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 87 (2008) (employer's burden, once
plaintiff establishes disparate impact, is to prove "reasonable factor other than age" defense, not
business necessity); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232, 240 (2005) (recognizing disparate
impact claims under the ADEA, but holding plaintiffs to tougher pre-1991 requirements for proving
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Although a given fact pattern might conceivably give rise to either or both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, the two claims are conceptually independent of one another. The Supreme Court articulated a clear-cut
distinction between impact and treatment claims in one of its early Title VII
cases, InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States:
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimina-

tion. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

. .

. Claims of

disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "disparate
impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of
discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory.26
Subsequent developments have only solidified this distinction. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that in disparate treatment cases, an employer's reason
for the adverse action qualifies as nondiscriminatory even if it has a disproportionate impact on the plaintiff's class and even if it is not a good reason. For
example, regarding an age discrimination claim in Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins,
the Court ruled that firing an employee to prevent his pension benefits from
vesting was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason despite its illegality under
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and regardless of the
adverse impact such a rule had on older employees.2 7 As the Court put it, an
employee's proximity to vesting and the employee's age are "analytically
distinct." 28 Underscoring the law's distinction between treatment and impact
claims, the Court rebuked the lower court in that case for allowing disparate
impact analysis to infect its consideration of the disparate treatment claim, with
the reminder that "[w]e long have distinguished between 'disparate treatment'
and 'disparate impact' theories of employment discrimination." 2 9
The force of the impact-treatment dichotomy reverberates throughout the
Court's case law. In an ADA case, Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, the Court
reiterated that the business justification for an employer's nondiscriminatory
reason-despite its disproportionate impact on a protected claim-has no relevance to a disparate treatment claim because impact and treatment claims are
separate theories of discrimination. 30 In that case, the plaintiff challenged the
employer's refusal to rehire him, arguing that the employer's purportedly
neutral reason, that the plaintiff violated a company misconduct rule, operated

such claims). Disparate impact claims are likewise available for disability-based impact under the
ADA. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53-54 (2003).
26. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citations omitted).
27. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
28. Id. at 611.
29. Id. at 609.
30. 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003).
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to bar the rehire of recovering addicts who were fired for drug or alcohol
dependency. Because the company's policy was disability-neutral, covering
other kinds of personal misconduct besides drug and alcohol abuse, the Court
classified this as tantamount to a disparate impact claim, which the plaintiff had
not brought. Although the company's rule might adversely affect persons with
certain disabilities, such impact was irrelevant to proving the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim. 3 1 Moreover, the company was not required to establish any
business justification for its facially neutral policy because the case was brought
as a disparate treatment claim.32
The Court has also policed the line separating disparate treatment and
disparate impact by refusing to allow disparate treatment claims to be defended
using the business necessity defense-the defense to a disparate impact case.
The Seventh Circuit made this mistake in United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., a case brought under Title VII and the PDA.3 3 Because the
employer policy challenged in that case treated fertile women differently from
fertile men-giving rise to a disparate treatment claim-the Supreme Court
chastised the circuit court for its "incorrect" acceptance of the employer's
business necessity defense. 34 Congress underscored this point in a subsequently
enacted provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII by
proclaiming: "A demonstration that an employment practice is required by
business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional
discrimination under this subchapter." 3 5
In keeping with the Court's rigid separation of impact and treatment cases,
the Court has also emphasized that proof of disparate impact is not required to
establish disparate treatment. In City of Los Angeles Department of Water
Power v. Manhart, the employer argued that its pension plan, which charged
female employees higher premiums than male employees, was not discriminatory because women as a group live longer than men, such that women as a
class did not pay more for the benefits they received.3 6 Responding to this
argument, the Court again raised the disparate treatment flag and refused to
permit the absence of any proof of disparate impact on women as a class to
affect the disparate treatment analysis. As the Court explained, the touchstone of
a disparate treatment claim is the unfavorable treatment of the individual on the
basis of sex.37
As this discussion shows (belabors, even), the separation of disparate treatment from disparate impact is the foundation on which employment discrimina-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 54-55.
Id.
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Id. at 198.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012).
435 U.S. 702, 703 (1978).
Id. at 711.
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tion doctrine is built. The distinction turns fundamentally on whether proof of
discriminatory intent is required or not. As the Court stated so crisply in
Teamsters, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical" in a disparate treatment
claim but "is not required under a disparate-impact theory." 38 When an employer's policy facially discriminates on the basis of a protected class status, the
intent to treat employees differently for a discriminatory reason is apparent in
the terms of the policy itself; in that set of cases, no further proof of discriminatory intent is necessary. 39 In the more common scenario where no policy
discriminates on its face-that is, in individual disparate treatment claims-the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer acted with a discriminatory intent.
B. THE MEANING OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT: WHAT COURTS HAVE IN MIND

Although the case law is clear that disparate treatment requires the plaintiff to
establish discriminatory intent whereas disparate impact does not, it is less clear
on the question of what exactly courts mean by discriminatory intent. One of
the biggest controversies in employment discrimination law today is whether
disparate treatment law reaches only the decision maker's conscious reliance on
a discriminatory motive or whether it also encompasses employment decisions
that in fact rely on a discriminatory reason but without any conscious desire to
do so by the decision maker. The latter type of discrimination is sometimes
referred to as "implicit bias" or unconscious discrimination. Legal scholars have
called attention to this phenomenon, and the need for discrimination law to
come to terms with it, for decades. 4 0 As social science research has developed
more sophisticated methods for discerning and documenting implicit bias, it has
increasingly sparked discussion and debate in legal scholarship.4 1

38. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (recognizing the disparate impact claim to reach "practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent").

39. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 188 (1991). In that set of cases, the
facially discriminatory policy itself reveals both causation-that an individual is treated differently
because of membership in a protected class-and the employer's conscious intent to do so because the
employer knows the terms of its own policies.
40. Two early foundational pieces are Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987), and Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995). For examples of later works extending these insights,
see Lu-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE (2006); Linda Hamilton

Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and
DisparateTreatment, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 997 (2006); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understand-

ing of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CALIF. L. REv. 747 (2001).
41. The implicit bias test, developed by a team of researchers and posted on a website hosted by
Harvard, has greatly accelerated the collection of data on implicit bias. See About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/aboutus.html [http://perma.cc/9UD2-WZTR]; see
also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Diferences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464 (1998) (discussing insights from the Implicit
Association Test).
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There is now abundant evidence from the field of social psychology that
implicit bias exists and is more common than many people realize.4 2 More
controversial than the proposition that implicit bias exists is the conclusion that
widespread implicit bias translates into real-world biased decision making in the
workplace. 4 3 Despite disagreement over the real-world effects of implicit bias,
few would deny that it sometimes motivates real-world behavior, and a number
of studies suggest that implicit sex-based and race-based bias infects actual
decision making quite often.44 Among the prominent findings supporting the
latter point: white NBA referees disproportionately make "calls" favoring white
players; 4 5 job applicants whose resumes list names perceived as belonging to
African-Americans get callbacks for interviews less often than otherwise identical resumes with names that do not trigger strong racial associations; 4 6 and
female musicians are more often selected for the symphony when tryouts are
conducted behind a screen that blocks the interviewer's view of the musician.
In the wake of this burgeoning literature, two related questions have sparked
academic interest. The first is whether employment discrimination law currently
reaches employment decisions based on implicit bias but not a conscious intent
to disfavor the protected class. 4 8 The second is whether it should reach such

42. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, FairMeasures: A BehavioralRealist Revision of
"Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1063 (2006); Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group
Attitudes and Beliefs From a DiscriminationWeb Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101 (2002) (reporting results
of website implicit bias testing showing a gap between expressly held beliefs and implicit biases).
43. For a critical perspective on the relevance of the implicit bias literature to real-world discrimination, see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).
44. See, e.g., Amelia M. Wirts, Discriminatory Intent and Implicit Bias: Title VII Liability for
Unwitting Discrimination, 57 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010). But see Michael
Selmi, Statistical Inequality and Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
199 (2016) (arguing that much of what scholars label "implicit bias" has a conscious element to it and
should be regarded as intentional discrimination). Although Selmi takes a different path to situating
so-called "implicit bias" as intentional discrimination-by emphasizing the consciousness of actors
who see racial disparities but choose to ignore them-his approach ultimately lands in the same place
as the unjustified impact disparate treatment model elaborated herein.
45. See Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, RacialDiscriminationAmong NBA Referees, 125 Q. J. ECON.
1859, 1860 (2010).
46. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than
Lakisha and Jamal?A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991
(2004).
47. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, OrchestratingImpartiality: The Impact of "Blind Auditions" on Female Musicians, 15 AM. ECON. REv. 715, 716 (2000); see generally Krieger & Fiske, supra
note 40.
48. For an argument that it does, see Krieger & Fiske, supra note 40, at 1052-56. For an argument
that it does not, see MAURICE WEXLER ET AL., IMPLICIT BIAS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: A VOYAGE INTO THE
UNKNOWN 2 (Bloomberg BNA 2013); see also Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (2005) (arguing that, properly interpreted, Title VII
"holds out more promise for remedying unconscious discrimination than has previously been recognized," but acknowledging that most courts engage in a search for conscious discriminatory intent in
deciding individual disparate treatment claims).
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conduct.4 9
On the first question, my reading of the case law is that the proof frameworks
courts use to decide disparate treatment claims-both the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting model and the newer motivating factor model-are designed
and used by courts to search for a conscious intent by the decision maker to rely
on a discriminatory reason and not merely the unintentional reliance on a
discriminatory reason. In taking such a narrow reading of the case law, I should
emphasize that this understanding is not dictated by the text of Title VII itself.
The statute could plausibly be read otherwise. Nowhere does the text limit the
statute's reach to intentionally biased decision making in codifying the unlawful
employment practices. Rather, the statutory language simply bars employers
from discriminating "because of such individual's" race or sex.5 0 If "because
of' denotes causation-in-fact, an employment decision that is made based in
whole or in part on the employee's sex or race would violate the statute
regardless of whether the actor deliberately relied on the discriminatory reason,
as long as that is in fact what occurred.
And yet, this is not the only plausible reading of the statutory text. An
alternative reading is that the term "discriminate" in 703(a)(1),5 1 the basis for
the disparate treatment claim, implicitly incorporates a requirement that the
decision maker acted intentionally, so that discrimination is understood to
involve the actor's conscious awareness of the reason for the decision. A
slightly different path to the same result would read into the "because of'
language a type of proximate cause restriction as an additional requirement to
supplement the requirement of causation-in-fact. Such an interpretation would
enable employers to avoid liability for employment actions that accidently treat
employees differently based on their membership in a protected class. Although
importing proximate cause-type limits into the statutory law of employment
discrimination is a highly questionable enterprise, 52 the Court has shown some
appetite for this project in other areas of employment discrimination doctrine.5 3

49. For a sampling of scholars urging caution in endorsing strategies that rely on discrimination law
to reach implicit bias, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The CriticalRole of
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REv. 1893, 1899 (2009);
Sabreena El-Amin, Addressing Implicit Bias Employment Discrimination:Is Litigation Enough?, 2015
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. ONLINE 1; Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129,
1226 (1999). For arguments favoring a more robust use of discrimination law, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REv. 477, 479
(2007); Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New
Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1234 (1999).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
5 1. Id.
52. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, What is TroublingAbout the Tortificationof Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1031 (2014); Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1199, 1200 (2013); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination,
62 B.U. L. REv. 1431, 1432 (2012).
53. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562
U.S. 411 (2011).
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Although the statute's language of causation lends itself to arguing against a
requirement of conscious bias by the decision maker in a disparate treatment
claim, the text is, alas, malleable enough to support the alternative view.
Setting aside the statutory ambiguity, the Court has become, in recent years,
increasingly wedded to a conception of the disparate treatment claim as predicated on the decision maker's conscious reliance on a discriminatory reason. In
its recent decision denying class certification in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
for example, the Court's skepticism of the plaintiffs' assertion of a common
policy of discrimination was fueled by an implicit understanding of discrimination as a conscious, and thereby rare, phenomenon.54 The Court's operative
assumption that discrimination is a deliberate phenomenon is reflected in its
statement that "left to their own devices most managers in any corporationand surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discriminationwould select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion
that produce no actionable disparity at all." 5 5 Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court contrasted the group of managers described in that statement with a
presumptively smaller group of managers who are "guilty of intentional discrimination." 5 6 Similarly, the Court's ill-fated decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.,57 which adopted a strict approach to Title VII's statute of
limitations for pay discrimination claims (and which was subsequently overridden by Congress in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act),5" equated pay discrimination with the employer's deliberate decision to pay a woman less because of her
sex. 5 9 The Court's underlying assumption in Ledbetter, reflected in its rejection
of the "paycheck accrual rule," which would treat the paycheck that pays a
woman less because of sex as the unlawful employment practice, is that the pay
violation consists of a conscious decision to pay a woman less because of her
sex.6

0

Neither of these two cases marks a sharp break with the past, however. Even
the Court's original disparate treatment proof framework in the landmark
McDonnell Douglas case is predicated on a working assumption that the
employer knew regardless of whether it relied on a discriminatory reason. 1 In
this framework, proof of the falsity of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason supports an inference of discrimination because it supports an
inference that the employer knowingly lied to cover up its real (and by

54. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
55. Id. at 355.
56. Id.
57. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
58. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
59. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 634.
60. See Deborah L. Brake, What Counts as "Discrimination"in Ledbetter and the Implicationsfor
Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 663 (2008); Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 363-64 (2008).
61. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799-800 (1973).
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implication, deliberate) discriminatory reason. That is why, when an employer's action is based on an honest belief in a nondiscriminatory reason, even if it
turns out to be factually incorrect, the falsity of the employer's reason does not
in that instance support a finding of discrimination.6 3
But the best evidence that the Court conceives of intentional discrimination
as involving a conscious discriminatory motive lies in its explanations for why
statutory discrimination law recognizes the disparate impact theory. The Court
has justified the disparate impact claim as being necessary to reach the kind of
discrimination that the disparate treatment claim fails to capture, including
actions resting on unconscious bias rather than a conscious discriminatory
motive. As Justice O'Connor explained in her plurality opinion in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, defending the applicability of disparate impact
doctrine to subjective decision making practices, even if the disparate treatment
theory could adequately capture all instances of intentionally discriminatory
decision making, "the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices
would remain." 6 4 More recently, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc. makes a similar point in explaining the justification for recognizing
disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act: without disparate impact
claims, biased decision making resting on implicit and unconscious bias would
remain unaddressed. 6 5 This justification for the disparate impact claim necessarily understands such discrimination as outside the proper scope of the disparate
treatment claim.6 6
Notwithstanding this pessimistic take on Supreme Court case law, some
scholars have persuasively argued that employment discrimination law does
reach implicit bias, pointing out that the proof models themselves do not require
the plaintiff to demonstrate a conscious intent in order to prevail. 7 Of course,
that is entirely correct. Plaintiffs can use circumstantial evidence to carry the
burden of proving intentional discrimination without any "smoking gun" proof
that the decision maker deliberately decided to discriminate on the basis of a

62. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (describing the
McDonnell Douglas proof framework as an inquiry "into a person's state of mind").
63. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) ("The fact that a court may
think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to
Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for
discrimination.").
64. 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
65. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
66. Cf Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L REv. 701, 768
(2006) (arguing that the adoption of an expansive disparate impact theory that can reach discretionary
decision making effectively foreclosed the development of a more expansive disparate treatment
regime).
67. See Melissa Hart, supra note 48, at 757, 771; Selmi, supra note 49, at 1237; see also Christopher
Cerullo, Everyone's a Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REv.
127 (2013) (summarizing the current state of employment discrimination in its capacity to reach
implicit bias).
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protected class, such as sex or race.6 " And yet, the question of the proof that
suffices to establish intentional discrimination is separate from the question of
what intentional discrimination means to the courts deciding these claims. My
reading of the case law is that courts typically understand intentional discrimination to mean a conscious discriminatory intent, although the proof model does
permit plaintiffs to prevail without specifically demonstrating that intent at a
conscious level. As a result, the ability of the disparate treatment claim to reach
implicit bias is hampered by judges' understandings of what it means to
intentionally discriminate. Courts view their job in a disparate treatment claim
as determining whether the plaintiff carried the burden to support an inference
of conscious discriminatory intent. That understanding of intent fuels courts'
reluctance to find-or to empower a jury to find-that the employer engaged in
intentional discrimination.
C. THE ROLE OF COMPARATORS IN PROVING DISPARATE TREATMENT

It is the courts' conception of intentional discrimination as a conscious
phenomenon that is driving another hallmark of disparate treatment law-the
stringent approach courts take toward proving discrimination through the use of
comparators. The trend in the case law is to require increasingly close comparators in order to establish a disparate treatment claim. The reason for insisting on
the close proximity of comparators is that otherwise courts will assume that the
differences between the plaintiff and the comparator are more likely to have
motivated the adverse treatment of the plaintiff than an intentionally discriminatory reason. 6 9 Even small differences between the comparator and the plaintiff
may prompt a court to infer that it is more likely than not that the decision
maker was thinking about something other than the plaintiff's sex or race in
making the decision to treat the plaintiff unfavorably. Courts' understanding of
discriminatory intent as a conscious phenomenon is the animating force behind
their insistence on a high degree of similarity between comparators.o

68. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58-62 (1st Cir. 1999) (permitting plaintiff
to prevail on employer's motion for summary judgment without any proof that the employer's intent
operated at a conscious level).
69. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 223 ("The ultimate basis for the elaborate legal rules the courts
have developed must be the belief that random fluctuations are more likely than discrimination in the
American workplace, and thus any differences are more likely attributable to a host of rational and
irrational factors than they are to an intent to discriminate.").

70. See, e.g., Hooker v. City of Toledo, 644 F. App'x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (comparators must be
"similarly situated" in all respects); Floyd-Gimon v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 716 F.3d 1141, 1150
(8th Cir. 2013) (test for similarly situated employees is rigorous, requiring similarity "in all relevant

respects"); Dickinson v. Springhill Hosps., Inc., 187 F. App'x 937, 939 (11th Cir. 2006) (requiring
comparators in "nearly identical" circumstances); Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 245

F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir.
1997) (comparators must be "similarly situated in all material respects," such as having the same
supervisor, job duties, and disciplinary standards); Sullivan, supra note 7, at 214-16 (discussing the
problem of requiring nearly identical comparators in individual disparate treatment cases).
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In recent years, some circuit courts have ramped up the stringency of this
requirement, insisting that plaintiffs identify a "similarly situated" comparator
outside the protected class who is treated more favorably "under nearly identical
circumstances." 7 As Suzanne Goldberg has pointed out, this increasing stringency comes at a time when workplaces are increasingly departing from a
model of work reliant on cookie-cutter, fungible employees-which is the kind
of workplace that the comparator heuristic presumes. 7 2 Adding to the difficulty
presented by the strict proximity required for comparators, some courts have
begun applying this standard at the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case stage
instead of the pretext stage of the case, granting summary judgment to the
employer even if the plaintiff has enough evidence to rebut the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason at the pretext stage.73 Other courts are
imposing this hurdle at the pretext stage, permitting the plaintiff to survive the
prima facie case, but then granting summary judgment because they view the
lack of a sufficiently similar comparator as undercutting the plaintiff's ability to
prove that the employer's reason was a pretext for discrimination.7 4 Whether
occurring at the prima facie case or the pretext stage, courts' insistence that
plaintiffs identify nearly identical comparators has emerged as a significant
roadblock to bringing successful, individual disparate treatment claims.
D. THE DASHED HOPES FOR A STREAMLINED FRAMEWORK

After the Court's 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,5 some
commentators believed that the more straightforward approach to proving
discrimination codified in Section 703(m) of the 1991 Civil Rights Actestablishing an unlawful employment practice where the plaintiff "demonstrates" that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the

71. See, e.g., Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 985 (5th Cir. 2015); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc.,
220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000).
72. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 755-59. As Professor Goldberg points out, the judicial insistence
on close comparators to prove discrimination also functions poorly for workplaces that are stratified
along the lines of the protected class. Id. at 759-61.

73. See Hague v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 560 F. App'x 328, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2014); Pepper v.
Precision Valve Corp., 526 F. App'x 335, 336 (4th Cir. 2013); Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523
F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008).
74. That is what happened in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., where the Eleventh Circuit articulated its
curious standard that the plaintiff's superior qualifications must be such that "the disparity in qualifications is so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face." 129 F. App'x 529, 533
(11th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court curtly rejected that colorful standard as unhelpful, but left intact,
without endorsing or rejecting, various alternative-and also strict-standards for proving pretext
through the relative qualifications of comparators. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-58
(2006). Despite having been taken to the woodshed, the Eleventh Circuit reached the same result on
remand under its nominally more inclusive (or at least less ridiculous) standard. Ash v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 190 F. App'x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2006) (formulating the standard in terms of a reasonable person
exercising impartial judgment).

75. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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practice" ,-would supersede the McDonnell Douglas framework.7 7 So far, that
promise has not materialized. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Desert
Palace holding that "direct evidence" is not required to entitle the plaintiff to a
"motivating factor" instruction to the jury tracking the proof framework in
703(m), 78 lower courts have continued to sort cases on separate tracks depending on whether they are classified as "inferential" or "direct," and restrict
plaintiffs to McDonnell Douglas if their proof method is deemed inferential.7 9
Although courts have stopped short of announcing an overt rule requiring direct
evidence for "direct" cases under 703(m), which Desert Palace forbids, they
have continued to take a stingy approach to the sufficiency of evidence needed
to show that discrimination was a motivating factor, in some cases tantamount
to a de facto requirement of the kind of statements that lower courts had been
calling direct evidence before the Desert Palace decision.o
For example, one Eleventh Circuit decision, Bell v. Capital Veneer Works,
limited the plaintiff, an African-American woman suing for race discrimination,
to the McDonnell Douglas proof model. 1 The court then granted the employer's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to identify a
sufficient comparator to make out a prima facie case-notwithstanding her
allegation that the decision maker had commented prior to discharging her, "[i]f
I could run the mill myself, I would fire everyone [sic] of these niggers.

76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
77. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII
DisparateTreatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REv. 83, 101 (2004); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the
Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1549, 1551 (2005); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est
Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of
Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv.
71, 72-73 (2003); cf Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination,79 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1243, 1281-82 (2008) (acknowledging the debate over the continuing vitality of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, but arguing that it survives as a useful method for proving discrimination).
78. 539 U.S. at 99-102.
79. See, e.g., Guimaraes v. SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 972-73 (8th Cir. 2012); Burnell v. Gates
Rubber Co., 647 F.3d 704, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2011); Twiggs v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987,
998 (10th Cir. 2011). For a recent decision bucking this trend, see Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834
F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016) (castigating lower courts in the circuit for separately applying "direct"
and "indirect" methods of proof, even as the court "accept[ed] its share of the responsibility" for
fomenting this dichotomy "because even as some panels were disparaging the 'direct' and 'indirect'
approaches, other panels were articulating them as governing legal standards"). It is too early to tell if
the court's strong rebuke in that case will prompt other circuits to similarly reject the bifurcation of
"direct" and "indirect" approaches to proving discrimination. Although helpful in jettisoning the
direct/indirect formula, however, the decision does nothing to clarify the interrelation between the
McDonnell Douglas and motivating factor proof models. Id. at 766 ("Today's decision does not concern
McDonnell Douglas or any other burden-shifting framework, no matter what it is called as shorthand.
We are instead concerned about the proposition that evidence must be sorted into different piles, labeled
'direct' and 'indirect,' that are evaluated differently.").
80. See William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: McDonnell Douglas to the
Rescue?, 92 WASH. U. L. REv. 1683, 1691-92, 1697-98 (2015) (discussing the post-Desert Palacestate
of the case law).
81. No. 06-12253, 2007 WL 245875 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2007).
82. Id. at *2 n.5.
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Explaining away the comment, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the comment was "direct evidence" of discrimination because it
was unclear how close in time the comment was to the firing.8 3 The court held
there was insufficient evidence of discrimination to entitle the plaintiff to a
mixed motive instruction under 703(m). 8 4 The court further opined that the
comment would fail to prove pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework
even if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, because a discriminatory
comment unrelated to the adverse action is not enough to demonstrate pretext.8 5
Thus, the plaintiff's failure to make out a prima facie case for want of a
sufficient comparator was not salvaged by the possibility of proceeding under
the 703(m) motivating factor model, despite the incendiary racist comment.
This case and others like it show that the Desert Palace decision has not
triggered the earthquake in disparate treatment law that some commentators
predicted. Instead, it has produced no more than a ripple, and not enough to free
plaintiffs from the strictures of the McDonnell Douglas framework." 6 Even in
cases that include evidence of biased comments, courts lean toward describing
the comments as "stray" and then filtering the evidence through the McDonnell
Douglas framework rather than the motivating factor framework. 87 As with the
McDonnell Douglas framework, courts' stringency in applying the motivating
factor model traces back to a belief that discriminatory intent requires conscious
reliance on a discriminatory reason. Although there was plenty of room for
uncertainty about whether the discriminatory motive had to be conscious or not
in the plurality's opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court has since
applied this model so as to make clear its premise that the motivating factor
operates at a conscious level.8 8 Moreover, lower court rulings like Belldismissing the significance of "stray remarks" for proving that discrimination

83. Id.
84. Id. at *2 n.6.
85. Id. at *2.
86. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 202 ("Despite Price Waterhouse and DesertPalace, the overwhelming majority of individual disparate treatment cases are still litigated under the McDonnell Douglas
proof structure . . . .").
87. For example, despite comments that could be understood to be racially biased-a white
supervisor referring to the African-American male plaintiffs as "boy"-the discrimination claim in Ash
v. Tyson Foods, Inc. was decided under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 129 F. App'x 529, 533
(11th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court did remand, however, holding that insofar as the Court of Appeals
ruling required a modifier such as "black" or "white" for the word "boy" to be considered discriminatory, it was incorrect. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006).
88. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) ("We take these words to mean
that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions."), and id. at 251 ("[W]e are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group . . . ."), with Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 413, 418 (2011)
(describing the requisite motive as "discriminatory animus" and the analogous motive in tort law as
"the malicious mental state"), and id. at 418-19 (contrasting the mental state of the agent who acts with
"unlawful animus" with the mindset of the decision maker who relies on "a report prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination" and finding only the former motive to support employer
liability for disparate treatment).
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was a motivating factor-reveal an assumption that the discriminatory motive
must consciously influence the adverse decision.
How courts conceptualize what it means to intentionally discriminate explains much of the stringency with which judges apply the doctrine and their
reluctance to find for plaintiffs. Applying the proof frameworks requires courts
to make empirical judgments about the likelihood that discrimination, instead of
something more benign, explained what happened.8 9 Naturally, if judges hold a
narrow view of what it means to intentionally discriminate, that understanding
will shape their assessment of the likelihood that discrimination occurred. If
judges view intentional discrimination as a rare phenomenon, even randomness
and idiosyncratic reasons as the basis for the decision-rather than any rational
or articulable reason-may have more persuasive pull than a discriminatory
explanation for what happened. 90 The ability of the proof frameworks to capture
real-world discrimination thus turns on judicial impressions of the continuing
prevalence of discrimination in today's workplace. In the five decades that have
transpired since the passage of Title VII, judges seemingly have become more
skeptical of the empirical proposition that discrimination is widespread. 91 This
is a product of the courts' understanding of discrimination as a conscious
phenomenon and a reflection of an ideological outlook that views American
society as largely postracial and postsexist.9 2 The skepticism judges exhibit
toward plaintiffs in discrimination claims dovetails with research findings about
majority-group members' disbelief in the veracity of discrimination claims
(with the exception of reverse discrimination claims).9 3 This shift in background

89. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 282-83 (1997) (arguing that the Court's empirical judgment about the
extent of discrimination shapes it application of the discriminatory intent standard); Sullivan, supra
note 7, at 197 (contending that judges' "own worldviews" underlie their strict approach to comparator
proof in individual disparate treatment claims).
90. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.
555, 561-62 (2001) (criticizing courts for resisting discrimination as an explanation for what they
perceive as the idiosyncratic or random treatment of employees).
91. See Anne Lawton, The MeritocracyMyth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85
MINN. L. REv. 587, 590-91 (2000) (explaining high rates of summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases as a product of judges' beliefs that discrimination is rare and that a person's
success in the workplace is more likely determined by individual merit). But cf Brian S. Clarke, The
Clash of Old and New Fourth Circuit Ideologies: Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. and the
Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 S.C. L. REV. 927, 927-28 (2015) (documenting a shift toward
more liberal, proemployee decisions in labor and employment law cases in the Fourth Circuit in the
wake of an influx of judges appointed by President Obama).
92. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IowA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (discussing the current
socio-political historic moment as one of "post-racialism," characterized by an ideology of racial
progress and the retreat from race as an organizing principle of justice); Green, supra note 60, at 356
(identifying and discussing the trend in the courts to see employment discrimination as an individual,
aberrational practice engaged in by consciously bad actors); Angela McRobbie, Post-Feminism and
Popular Culture, 4 FEMINIST MEDIA STUD. 255, 255 (2004) (discussing the rise of post-feminism as the
prevailing cultural ideology of gender and comparing and contrasting it to 1980s-style backlash).
93. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological
Forces and Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679, 714 n.148
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assumptions makes it unsurprising that so many scholars have found that
employment discrimination claims tend to fare worse in the courts than other
legal claims.9 4 The low success rate of employment discrimination claims,
combined with the burgeoning literature on the prevalence of implicit bias,
suggests that disparate treatment claims are unlikely to reach all but the most
overt and conscious forms of discriminatory bias.
II. A

BREAK-OUT HYBRID: THE CURIOUS CASE OF YOUNG V UPS

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court has recently shaken up the disparate treatment and disparate impact categories, along with the solidity of the
proof frameworks that govern them, in one area of employment discrimination
law: the PDA. In its 2015 opinion in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the
Court crafted a hybrid treatment-by-impact model that smudges the edges of the
categories and holds greater promise for reaching unconscious and implicit bias
than the classic individual disparate treatment model. 95 This Section begins with
a brief sketch of pregnancy accommodation cases in the lower courts prior to
the Supreme Court's intervention. It then dissects the majority and dissenting
opinions in Young, exploring how the decision represents a break from the
structures and frameworks of employment discrimination law elaborated in Part
I. Having shown how Young unsettles the canon of employment discrimination
law previously described, the Part then situates the decision within other
doctrinal exceptions to the norm that breach the impact-treatment divide.
Rather than an isolated mistake, Young should be seen as one of several
aberrations that cut against the grain of the dominant structure of employment
discrimination law. The Part concludes with a defense of the Court's newly
crafted disparate treatment claim for pregnancy, supporting the law's move
beyond a conception of discriminatory intent as conscious bias and potentially
reaching a broader range of employer policies that implicitly undervalue pregnant workers.

(2007); Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-

Discrimination Law, 96 MIN. L. REv. 1275, 1320-22 (2012); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1153-55 (2008).

&

94. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintifs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 547,
566-67 (2003) (finding that plaintiffs are reversed at higher rates than defendants); Wendy Parker,
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 889, 932 (2006)
(reporting a low success rate of race and national origin plaintiffs). But see Minna J. Kotkin, Outing
Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH.
LEE L. REv. 111, 144 (2007) (reporting that plaintiffs recover $54,651 on average, which suggests they
have reasonable success in settling lawsuits). More recent research finds that employment discrimination claims are particularly difficult to win for plaintiffs challenging intersecting forms of bias and even
for plaintiffs bringing single-identity claims that belong to more than one disadvantaged group. See
Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv.

1439, 1457-59 (2009); see also Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAw & Soc'y REv. 991, 1017-18 (2011).
95. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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A. PRE-YOUNG PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION CASES: THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR
COMPARATORS AND DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

An appreciation of what the Court did in Young requires some exposure to the
state of pregnancy accommodation cases in the lower courts prior to that
decision. By now, this story will have a familiar ring. Parallel to the trends
discussed above, the PDA case law in the lower courts took a stringent approach
to comparator proof and devolved into a search for a consciously discriminatory
intent by the employer, making it extraordinarily difficult to prove pregnancy
discrimination when employers provided accommodations to some workers but
not to pregnant women.9 6 What makes this particularly notable in the pregnancy
discrimination cases is that in addition to a ban on discriminating on the basis of
pregnancy, which occupies the first clause of the PDA, the statute also contains
a second clause in which the class of comparators is identified only by their
similarity in ability or inability to work. This clause requires "women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" to "be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work." 97
In many of the PDA cases leading up to Young, the plaintiff challenged the
employer's policy of accommodating employees with on-the-job injuries but
not offering similar accommodations to employees who became pregnant,
despite the similarity of their work restrictions. Lower courts rejected these
challenges, faulting the women's claims for failing to identify nonpregnant
comparators with similar work restrictions from off-the-job conditions and
concluding, as a result, that the plaintiffs failed to establish discriminatory
intent. 98 Plaintiffs were dealt similar results even when the challenged employer
policies swept more broadly than on-the-job injury accommodations, extending
accommodations to a larger class of employees through collective bargaining
agreements and to employees who qualified as disabled under the ADA, while
still omitting pregnant women. Lower courts upheld these policies too, finding
that the employees who benefitted from these accommodations were not proper
comparators for the pregnant plaintiffs and that the employers' reasons for
extending accommodations to those employees negated any inference of discriminatory intent underlying the refusal to extend similar accommodations to pregnant workers. 99

96. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act at 35, 21 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 67, 87-90 (2013) (discussing the state of the law under the
PDA in the lower courts prior to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Young v. UPS).

97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
98. See, e.g., Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641-43 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly
Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204,
206, 208 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Brake & Grossman, supra note 96, at 87-90 (summarizing lower
court decisions in challenges to on-the-job injury policies).

99. See, e.g., Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698, 702-03 (7th Cir. 2012); Serednyj
v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641-43.
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Such was the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in the Young case, which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review. The Fourth Circuit had found
United Parcel Service's (UPS) distinctions for accommodating some groups of
workers, but not pregnant employees, to be "pregnancy blind" and not based on
a discriminatory intent because the justification for the more favorable treatment
of the preferred group of workers was articulated in a pregnancy-neutral
fashion. 00 The characterization of such policies as pregnancy-neutral reflects a
view of pregnancy discrimination as requiring a state of mind akin to animus, a
conscious desire to disfavor pregnant workers because they are pregnant. The
search for antipregnancy animus doomed all but the most blatant pregnancy
discrimination claims-such as where the employer inexplicably denied pregnant workers the accommodations that it gave to others of similar work capacity
without a plausible nondiscriminatory rationale for doing so.o The whittling
away of possible comparators in the search for discriminatory intent doomed
most such claims, however, with plaintiffs unable to show that the employer
adopted the policy to deliberately harm pregnant women.
B. ENTER YOUNG V UPS AND A SHIFT IN THE PARADIGM

The Supreme Court's decision in Young broke from this approach and toppled
some pillars of disparate treatment law along the way. The Court's opinion
began with the text of the PDA, identifying what the majority viewed as an
ambiguity in the language of the Act. Clause two of the PDA states that "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work." 10 2
The Court discerned ambiguity in the statute's failure to specify the level
of treatment required for pregnant women in a workplace that grants favorable
treatment to some, but not all, nonpregnant workers. Because the PDA's language does not tie the treatment of pregnant women to "all" or "any" employees
similar in ability to work, the Court found the text more open-ended. 103 Does it,
the Court asked, "mean that courts must compare workers only in respect to the
work limitations that they suffer" and "ignore all other similarities or differences between pregnant and nonpregnant workers?" 1 04 "Or does it mean that
courts, when deciding who the relevant 'other persons' are, may consider other

100. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that "UPS has
crafted a pregnancy-blind policy" that is "at least facially a 'neutral and legitimate business practice,'
and not evidence of UPS's discriminatory animus toward pregnant workers").

101.
May 9,
102.
103.
104.

See Lochren v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925(ARL), 2008 WL 2039458, at *1 (E.D.N.Y
2008), vacated, 344 F. App'x 706 (2d Cir. 2009).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1350 (2015).
Id. at 1348.
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similarities and differences as well" and "[i]f so, which ones?"1 0 5
The Court began with the premise that Peggy Young's challenge to UPS's
failure to accommodate her lifting restriction while pregnant was a disparate
treatment claim.1 0 6 Indeed, the Court took pains to note that Young did not
bring a disparate impact claim, highlighting the difference between the two in
that disparate impact focuses on "the effects of an employment practice, determining whether they are unlawful irrespective of motivation or intent." 1 0 7
Having posited a sharp division between treatment and impact claims, the
Court proceeded to the heart of the dilemma in clause two. "Suppose the
employer would not give [a pregnant employee] the 'same accommodations' as
another employee," but its reason fell within a "facially neutral category," such
as favoring on-the job injuries-"[w]hat is a court then to do?," Justice Breyer
asked plaintively. os The Court's labeling of such a policy as facially neutral is
somewhat puzzling because under the terms of the PDA, a policy that treats
work restrictions caused by pregnancy differently than those caused by other
conditions is not neutral. Because pregnancy by definition is not an on-the-job
injury, such a policy differentiates based on the source of the condition causing
the work restriction. A policy that favors classes of workers that by definition
omit pregnant workers (along with some nonpregnant workers) could be characterized as overtly discriminatory on the basis of pregnancy.1 09 The Court
rejected this view, however, terming it a "most-favored-nation status" for
pregnant workers, a result it found Congress could not have intended. 1 o
Rejecting the plaintiff's proposed source-of-condition rule and the employer's
bright-line rule denying any independent obligation on employers from clause
two, the Court forged a middle path. It set out to craft a disparate treatment
claim for pregnancy discrimination based on the unfavorable treatment of
pregnancy compared to some-but not all-other conditions causing a similar
effect on work. But the Court struggled with how to fashion disparate treatment
doctrine in this setting. It recognized that "disparate-treatment law normally
permits an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm
members of a protected class, even if their implementation sometimes harms
those members, as long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory,

105. Id. at 1348-49.
106. Id. at 1345.
107. Id. Young sought permission to amend her complaint in the district court to add a disparate
impact claim, but the court denied her motion for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because
she did not file a disparate impact charge with the EEOC. See Young v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc.,
No. DKC-08-2586, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30764, at *6-7 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2010).
108. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349.
109. See Michael C. Harper, Confusion on the Court: Distinguishing Disparate Treatment from
DisparateImpact in Young v. UPS and EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 96 B.U. L. REV. 543,
545-46 (2016) (arguing that the Court erred in failing to recognize the UPS policy as overt discrimination against pregnant workers and analogizing it to the no-hats policy struck down in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., which also drew facially discriminatory lines that disfavored the class of
protected workers along with disfavoring some workers outside of the protected class).
110. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1350.
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nonpretextual reason for doing so.""' And it found "no reason to believe
Congress intended its language in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to embody
a significant deviation from this approach." 1 2 And yet, the Court went on to
deviate significantly from the classic disparate treatment framework.
The Court turned to the familiar McDonnell Douglas three-stage, burdenshifting approach but ended up modifying it significantly. First, the plaintiff
must make out a prima facie case, the heart of which requires showing that the
employer refused to accommodate the plaintiff's pregnancy but accommodated
"others 'similar in their ability or inability to work."'13 The employer "may
then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on
'legitimate, nondiscriminatory' reasons for denying her accommodation." 1 1 4
Here is where the trip through McDonnell Douglas gets strange: saving money
and/or maximizing convenience are not, the Court cautioned, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for refusing to accommodate pregnant workers. If they
were, the Court explained, the employer's benefit plan in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert' 1 5-the very case that provoked Congress to enact the PDA to change
the result in that case-would be permissible.1 1 6 Regardless of whether the
Court is correct in that assessment, the disallowance of cost as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason marks a major departure from the McDonnell Douglas framework.' 1 7 The Court has previously made clear that any reason that is
analytically distinct from the protected class suffices to discharge the employer's burden to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, including cost.118
Indeed, if cost is dispensed with, it is hard to know what plausible nondiscriminatory reason an employer might assert for why it accommodates some workers
but leaves out pregnant workers. Nevertheless, the Court clarified, to discharge
the employer's burden at this stage, the employer must offer some reason other
than cost or administrative convenience for not grouping pregnant women with
the classes of workers whose similar work restrictions are being accommodated.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1354.
114. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
115. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
116. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353-54.
117. It is not obvious that the Court is correct about this. The plan challenged in Gilbert, as the Court
points out elsewhere, singled out pregnancy for exclusion while accommodating virtually all other
conditions. Id. at 1353. UPS's plan, as the Court repeatedly observed, treated pregnant workers worse
than some favored employees, but the same as others. See id. at 1347. Indeed, it is because UPS treated
pregnant workers the same as some classes of other disfavored workers that the Court saw the need to
turn to McDonnell Douglas in the first place. See id. at 1345, 1354.
118. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1993) (holding that an employer's
practice of terminating employees right before they vest in pension benefits that would cost the
employer money is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under the ADEA because, even if it has a
disproportionate effect on older workers, it is analytically distinct from age).
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Things became stranger still when the Court turned to the pretext stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The plaintiff may prevail at this stage by exposing the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason as a pretext for
discrimination. The court explained:
[T]he plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence
that the employer's policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers,
and that the employer's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather-when considered along with
the burden imposed-give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. 1 19
In other words, the weakness of the employer's business justification for
treating some nonpregnant employees more favorably than pregnant women
may establish that the reason was a pretext for discrimination. 12 0 The Court did
not elaborate on what kinds of business justifications might stand up to this
scrutiny or how courts should measure the strength of the employer's business
justification.
Two points are worth noting about this newly minted variation on McDonnell
Douglas. First, it is the burden on pregnant women as a class-the adverse
effects of the employer's policies-that, when left unexplained by a sufficiently
strong business justification, creates an inference of intentional discrimination. 12 1 This move rips the seams out of the traditional understanding of what
separates impact from treatment claims. Time and again, the Court has reiterated that proof that a practice has a disparate impact does not establish proof of
intent to discriminate. 12 2
Second, the burden on the plaintiff to rebut the employer's justification
differs substantially from the typical proof of pretext. In the usual case, the

119. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
120. Id. Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, would have adopted a narrower approach than the
majority. He agreed that cost alone could not justify the differential treatment of pregnant women, but
opined that other than disallowing cost-based justifications, courts should not probe the strength of
employer justifications for "a truly neutral rule." Id. at 1359 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito's
acceptance of neutrality would reinscribe the core error of Gilbert. If a "neutral reason" could justify
treating pregnant workers differently, plans like the one at issue in Gilbert could likely survive
challenge. See id. at 1360 (describing UPS's desire to comply with the ADA as a "neutral reason" for
accommodating workers with disabilities but not pregnant workers).
121. The opinion leaves some uncertainty as to what kind of burden the plaintiff must show and
what kind of evidence will demonstrate it. See id. at 1354 ("The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer
accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large
percentage of pregnant workers."). The uncertainties include what percentage of accommodated
nonpregnant workers suffices, what percentage of unaccommodated pregnant workers suffices, and
whether the percentages should be established through the number of actual employees requesting
accommodations or some other metric, such as the number of conditions accommodated under the
employer's policies.
122. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51 (2003); Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at
611-12; Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
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plaintiff must show that the employer's reason was not the "true" reason-that
is, that the employer's reason was knowingly offered as a cover-up for the real
reason, intentional discrimination. 12 3 The employer's deceit in proffering a false
reason may be inferred from the plaintiff's proof of its falsity, but the ultimate
burden is on the plaintiff to support the inference that the employer's "real"
reason was intentional discrimination. In the newly configured PDA claim,
however, the plaintiff need not prove that the employer's reason was not its
genuine motivation for acting. Rather, the plaintiff need show only that it was
not a "strong" enough reason "to justify the burden" on pregnant women. 12 4
This retooling of the McDonnell Douglas model unsettles the disparate treatment apple cart. Proof of unjustified impact now serves to establish discriminatory intent in a disparate treatment pregnancy discrimination claim.
Predictably, this paradigm shift prompted scathing criticism from the dissent.
Accusing the majority of "bung[ling] the dichotomy between claims of disparate treatment and claims of disparate impact," the dissenting Justices, in an
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, lambasted "the topsy-turvy world created
by" the majority in which "a pregnant woman can establish disparate treatment
by showing that the effects of her employer's policy fall more harshly on
pregnant women than on others ... and are inadequately justified."1 2 5 The
resulting mish-mash, the dissent continued, "can thus serve only one purpose:
allowing claims that belong under Title VII's disparate-impact provisions to be
brought under its disparate-treatment provisions instead." 1 2 6
Troubled by the dissent's cajoling, the majority repeatedly proclaimed its
faithfulness to traditional disparate treatment doctrine. 127 However, the Court's
best effort to maintain a distance between the two categories amounts to a
feeble declaration that "the continued focus on whether the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination avoids confusing the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact doctrines."1 2 8
And yet, the "sufficient evidence" needed to support the inference of intentional
discrimination is precisely the unjustified impact on pregnant women. Moreover, the intentional discrimination that the Young framework purports to find
may exist as a matter of law even if the employer genuinely believed its
factually correct-albeit (as determined by a court) insufficiently weightyjustification for having a policy that burdens pregnant women. As Justice

123. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993).
124. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
125. Id. at 1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 1355 ("This approach . . is consistent with our longstanding rule that a plaintiff can
use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer's apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons . . . ."); id. ("[I]t is hardly anomalous (as the dissent makes it out to be) that a plaintiff may rebut
an employer's proffered justifications by showing how a policy operates in practice." (internal citation
omitted)).
128. Id.
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Kennedy pointed out in his less caustic dissent, there was no evidence of
"animus or hostility to pregnant women" in the Young case itself-an observation the majority did not attempt to refute, despite ruling for the plaintiff on the
employer's motion for summary judgment. 1 2 9 Although the majority did not
convincingly answer the dissent's objection that it had blurred the lines between
disparate impact and disparate treatment, it might have pointed out that this was
not the first time the Court had done so.
C. YOUNG'S FELLOW TRAVELERS: SOUNDING THE MINOR CHORDS OF DISPARATE
TREATMENT LAW

Although Young marks a departure from the traditional categories and proof
frameworks of employment discrimination law, a closer look at this body of law
reveals that there is more porosity along the treatment-impact border than the
dissenters in Young and the Court's canonical cases acknowledge. In Young, the
unjustified burden on pregnant women of accommodating other conditions with
a similar effect on work establishes a disparate treatment claim. At first glance,
Young stands out as an anomalous hybrid-a disparate treatment-by-proof-ofimpact claim. A deeper probe into the margins of disparate treatment law,
however, finds other instances of blurred boundaries in which insufficiently
explained impact serves to establish disparate treatment.
Harassment claims, for example, have long been difficult to situate as simple
disparate treatment-although it is well-settled doctrinally that harassment claims
fall on the disparate treatment side of the line. 1 30 Disparate treatment's grasp on
harassment is particularly tenuous where the harassment is not targeted at a
particular individual, but permeates the environment for all workers. The same
is true for harassment claims based on conduct by coworkers and customers, as
opposed to supervisors acting as agents of the employer, where liability is
predicated on the employer's poor excuse for not responding more effectively. 1 3 1 Other discriminatory practices besides harassment have also occasionally registered as intentional discrimination based on the employer's insufficient
reasons for burdening the protected class. 13 2

129. Id. at 1366 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil Rights Act

of 1991, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1037, 1044-45 (1993) (explaining that the 1991 Act's addition of a
damages remedy for "intentional discrimination," as opposed to disparate impact, means that sexual
harassment claimants will now be able to seek damages under the statute); see also Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (treating sexual harassment claim as an intentional discrimination
claim for purposes of the 1991 Civil Rights Act). But see L. Camille H6bert, The DisparateImpact of
Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 341 (2005) (arguing that a disparate
impact approach to sexual harassment is similarly valid).
131. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,Accommodation, and
the Disaggregationof DiscriminatoryIntent, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1357 (2009) (explaining the disconnect between some sexual harassment claims and classic disparate treatment theory).

132. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a weak
justification for employee strength test with a marked disparate impact on women supported disparate

treatment verdict for the EEOC); Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1306-08 (10th Cir. 2006)
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Indeed, even the paragon of disparate treatment, McDonnell Douglas, was
not initially clear about the boundary separating disparate treatment and disparate impact claims when it came to scrutinizing the sufficiency of employer
justifications for discriminatory treatment. Even as the Court criticized the court
below for invoking the Griggsjob-relatedness standard to test the sufficiency of
the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in the individual disparate
treatment case before it, the Court's own separation of the two theories was less
than crisp. The Court instructed that Griggs was inapplicable to the present case
because Griggs involved challenges to qualifications "neutral on their face" that
"operated to exclude many blacks who were capable of performing effectively
in the desired positions." 1 3 3 Accordingly, the Court concluded, the lower court
had been wrong to insist that the company's reason for not rehiring the plaintiff
must be based on demonstrably objective criteria instead of its subjective
evaluation of unfitness due to the plaintiff's participation in the illegal stall-in.
And yet, the Court's opinion elsewhere suggests that the weight of the employer's reason may be relevant in the ultimate determination of whether the rehire
decision was motivated by a discriminatory intent. In emphasizing the strength
of the defendant's actual reason for refusing to rehire the plaintiff who had
engaged in an illegal and disruptive demonstration against it, the Court suggested that some employer justifications may not be "reasonable" or "legitimate" enough to dispel an inference of discriminatory intent. 13 4 Although, as
discussed above, the Court's subsequent cases took a different path, refusing to
test the sufficiency of the employer's justification in an individual disparate
treatment claim, it is worth remembering that the Court's foundational disparate
treatment case was itself ambiguous about the precise boundaries of the treatment and impact categories.
A 2009 decision reveals that establishing disparate treatment by way of
unjustified impact is not unheard of in the Court's modern case law-nor is it
always a progressive move. The reverse discrimination case of Ricci v. DeStefano
also blurred the boundaries of disparate treatment and disparate impact, despite

(finding an insufficient business justification for strict English-only policy supported employees'
disparate treatment claim); Selmi, supra note 66, at 776 n.266 (describing the circuit court's decision in
Waters v. Furnco Constr Corp., 551 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977), as "a hybrid" because the court "applied
a business necessity standard to hold the employer liable for disparate treatment").
133. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
134. Id. at 802-03 ("We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every matter which fairly could
be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire."); id. at 803 n.17 (noting that, because in the
instant case the employer's reason was the plaintiff's unlawful activity against the employer, the Court
needed "not consider or decide here whether, or under what circumstances, unlawful activity not
directed against the particular employer may be a legitimate justification for refusing to hire"); id. at
806 n.21 (acknowledging uncertainty about whether past participation in unlawful conduct predicts
future such conduct, but stating that "in this case, given the seriousness and harmful potential of
respondent's participation in the 'stall-in' and the accompanying inconvenience to other employees, it
cannot be said that petitioner's refusal . . lacked a rational and neutral business justification"); id at
804 (citing the employer's "reaction, if any, to [the plaintiff's] legitimate civil rights activities" as
evidence relevant to showing pretext).
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the Court's failure to acknowledge that it did so. 1 35 In this Title VII disparate
treatment challenge to New Haven's decision to discard the results of a standardized promotion test because the test had a disparate impact on minority firefighters, the Court found that the city's actions were intentionally discriminatory
toward the beneficiaries of the test, a group of predominantly white firefighters. 136 It did so despite the absence of any proof that city officials acted with a
discriminatory intent to harm whites. The Court never openly acknowledged
that the city's actions were facially neutral; the city discarded the tests results
for all of the firefighters and denied promotions to all of them. 13 7 Although the
city's motive of avoiding a disparate impact suit by minority firefighters necessarily meant that it was willing to block promotions that would otherwise disproportionately benefit white firefighters, this established only that discarding the test
results had a disparate impact on white test-takers. Instead of requiring proof
that the city acted with a deliberate intent to harm white firefighters because
they are white, the Court focused on the lack of a sufficient justification for
burdening the high-performing test-takers. 138 Because the Court found the test
used to be job-related, it concluded that the city had an insufficient basis to
believe that it would have faced disparate impact liability for making promotions based on the test. 13 9 In other words, the unjustified burden on a group of
predominantly white test-takers formed the crux of the disparate treatment
violation.
The Ricci Court's reliance on the significant burden on the plaintiffs, combined with the employer's insufficient justification for the burden, parallels the
Court's approach in Young. Albeit at different ends of the political spectrum,
Young and Ricci-along with other outliers at the margins of disparate treatment
law-serve as examples of cases where insufficiently explained harm to the
protected class can establish a disparate treatment claim.
Notably, the dissenting Justices in Young who accused the majority of
obliterating the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impactJustices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia-were in the majority in Ricci. Although
these Justices viewed New Haven's decision to throw out the test results for all
firefighters to avoid a disparate harm to minority firefighters-without sufficient
justification for doing so-as intentionally discriminatory, they rejected unjustified impact as a method for teasing out a discriminatory intent behind the
impact on pregnant women under UPS's policies. Justice Alito, who concurred

135. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
136. Id. at 579.
137. See id. at 562, 574.
138. Id. at 579-80. Contrast the Court's approach to the equal protection challenge brought by
women against Massachusetts' absolute veterans' preference in public employment statute: despite the
state's knowledge that the benefiting class was over 98% male, and the known effect of practically
shutting women out of employment opportunities, the Court found the plaintiffs failed to prove that the
state adopted the preference "because of' rather than "in spite of' the reduced employment opportunities for women. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 270, 279 (1979).
139. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587, 592-93.
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on a narrower ground in Young, was also quicker to find disparate treatment in
Ricci than in Young. 14 0 Concurring with the majority in Ricci, Justice Alito did
not accept the city's asserted motive of complying with Title VII's disparate
impact law as a neutral justification for the burden it imposed on white
officers. 14 1 In Young, however, Justice Alito found it "obvious" that UPS had a
"neutral" reason for accommodating persons with nonpregnancy disabilities in
its motive to comply with the ADA. 14 2 To Justice Alito, UPS's "neutral reason"compliance with the law-belied any inference of intentional discrimination
that could arise from the different treatment of pregnant women and persons
with disabilities. 143 And yet, New Haven's desire to comply with the law did not
dispel the inference of discrimination the Court found from the unjustified
impact on white firefighters.
These Justices' different approaches to inferring discriminatory intent in Ricci
and Young reflect the influence of contested baselines going to the heart of
discrimination law. Judged by an implicit baseline that places pregnant workers
in a different class than the employees whose conditions are accommodated, the
UPS practice appeared neutral. In contrast, New Haven's discarding of test
results that would have benefitted a group of largely white firefighters looked
suspicious and intentionally discriminatory when viewed against an implicit
baseline of white privilege-the expectation that when white employees excel
on a test, it is a reflection of their merit. Underlying the Justices' approaches in
both cases are empirical and normative judgments about the prevalence of
discrimination (race discrimination against whites in Ricci and sex discrimination against pregnant workers in Young) and what counts as discriminatory
(taking unjustified action known to benefit minorities in the former and imposing an unjustified burden on pregnant workers in the latter). To the Justices in
the Ricci majority, the predominantly white test-takers had earned their high
scores, so the city's actions denying them promotion appeared intentionally
discriminatory. For the dissenters in Young, the nonpregnant workers were more
deserving of accommodations, so the company's failure to extend accommodations to pregnant workers was not intentionally discriminatory. 144
Young may be aberrational, but it is not without peers in straddling the
boundary between disparate treatment and disparate impact. Instead of being
dismissed as a stand-alone mistake, the Young framework should be mined for

140. Justice Alito's citation of Ricci as standing for the proposition that claims of discrimination
"require proof of discriminatory intent" glosses over the extremely expansive approach that Ricci takes
to proving the employer's discriminatory intent. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338,
1356 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
141. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring).
142. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1360 (Alito, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 1359-60 (Alito, J., concurring).
144. Similarly, in Feeney, the Court viewed veterans as deserving of the employment practice;
hence, the Court's determination that any whiff of discriminatory intent from the gender impact on
women was dispelled by the "legislative policy" behind the veterans preference "that has in itself
always been deemed to be legitimate." Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).
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its potential to spark a more robust and transformative approach to pregnancy
discrimination in the workplace.
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF YOUNG FOR EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT IN THE PDA

It is unclear just how far this newly minted, hybrid disparate treatment claim
will go in eradicating the kind of employer policies at issue in Young. The Court
reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision that Peggy Young failed as a matter of
law to make out a prima facie case, but it did not decide whether her evidence
was sufficient to get to a jury on the issue of pretext. 14 5 The case settled soon
after the Court issued its decision. 14 6 The implications for future claims are
further obscured by the Court's muddled opinion. In kitchen-sink fashion, the
majority listed the facts in favor of Young without identifying which ones were
crucial to its conclusion that her claim survived summary judgment. 147 Fans of
minimalism will note that this kind of fact-specificity leaves room for the law to
develop incrementally. But some of the facts the Court recites are so idiosyncratic that there is room to distinguish all subsequent PDA cases. 148 Still, the
early returns are promising for plaintiffs. 149
Despite uncertainty about the reach of the Young opinion, the Court's unconventional approach holds promise for easing the difficulties created for employees by the current employment discrimination regime. First, it loosens the

145. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355-56.
146. UPS actually changed its policies to make light-duty work available to pregnant employees
while the case was pending in the Supreme Court. See Brigid Schulte, With Supreme Court Case
Pending, UPS Reverses Policy on Pregnant Workers, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wpl2014/10/29/with-supreme-court-case-pending-ups-reversespolicy-on-pregnant-workers/ [https://perma.cc/KM75-K2M6]. After the Court's decision, UPS entered
into a settlement agreement with Peggy Young. See Robin Shea, Breaking: Young and UPS Settle
Pregnancy Lawsuit, EMP. & LAB. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/
pregnancy/breaking-young-and-ups-settle-pregnancy-lawsuit! [https://perma.cclG697-UQT3].
147. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1346-47 (reciting facts favorable to Young in the record below); id. at
1355 (denying summary judgment based on the facts Young entered into the record).
148. Id. at 1346 (including specific statements by a UPS manager in the list of facts).

149. See, e.g., Luke v. CPlace Forest Park SNF, L.L.C., 608 F. App'x 246 (5th Cir. 2015) (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment to employer in PDA case alleging discriminatory refusal to
accommodate plaintiff's pregnancy and remanding in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Young);

Gonzales v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 961 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (relying on Young to deny
employer's motion to dismiss PDA claim alleging discriminatory failure to accommodate lactating
employee's need for breaks to express breast milk); Martin v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 794
(M.D. La. 2015) (denying employer's motion for summary judgment in PDA failure-to-accommodate
claim where plaintiff identified two arguably, but not indisputably, similar comparators who were

accommodated); LaSalle v. City of New York, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41163, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2015) (denying employer's motion to dismiss plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim alleging
discriminatory refusal to grant request for light duty work and stating "[t]he Supreme Court recently
dispelled any doubt that a plaintiff may bring a PDA claim based on her employer's failure to

accommodate her pregnancy."); McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 2015) (relying
on Young to reverse lower court's grant of summary judgment to employer in employee's state law
pregnancy discrimination claim for discriminatory failure to accommodate pregnancy).
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tightness of the requisite comparator proof that was endemic in the pre- Young
case law. Pregnant employees may now compare themselves to other workers
similarly affected in their ability or inability to work, as the PDA demands,
without proving perfect similarity in all respects, such as in the employer's
reason for conferring accommodations. 1 5 0 This greater leniency on the relevant
comparators for purposes of making out a prima facie case should help plaintiffs clear a significant hurdle that had blocked these claims in the lower courts.
Describing the burden of the prima facie case as "not onerous," the Young
opinion emphasized, "[n]either does it require the plaintiff to show that those
whom the employer favored and those whom the employer disfavored were
similar in all but the protected ways." 1 5 1
The greater flexibility in the comparator proof available to pregnant workers
goes hand-in-hand with another important feature of the new PDA model: the
Court's use of impact-type proof to establish intentional discrimination. Whereas
the burden of comparator proof in the typical disparate treatment case is to
support an inference of discriminatory intent behind the employer's unfavorable
treatment of the plaintiff, the unjustified impact on pregnant workers performs
the work of establishing intentional discrimination in the PDA claim crafted in
Young. This would not make sense if the plaintiff's ultimate burden were to
expose a subjective state of mind on the part of the employer to deliberately
disadvantage pregnant women. Rather, the Court's theory behind inferring
intentional discrimination in the PDA claim must be that the burden on pregnant
women, when insufficiently justified by a business rationale, reflects insufficient
concern for the harmful effects on pregnant workers' employment. The question
at the heart of this model is, as the Court asks, "why, when the employer
accommodated so many, could it not accommodate pregnant women as well?"1 5 2
The employer's proffer of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory answer to that question is not enough to prevent the court from finding discriminatory intent if the
answer is not persuasive enough-in the assessment of the reviewing court-to
justify the harm to pregnant workers. 15 3
In revamping the classic disparate treatment framework, which searches for a
deliberate intent to discriminate, this hybrid model is well-designed to reach the

150. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355 ("[T]here is a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more
favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished
from Young's."). Justice Alito's concurring opinion takes a somewhat more stringent approach to the
comparator question, interpreting the second clause "to mean that pregnant employees must be
compared with employees performing the same or very similar jobs." Id. at 1357-58 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Justice Alito's approach would leave open the possibility that a plaintiff's proof might fail
if there were no one else in the company who held the plaintiff's same job. See id. at 1358 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Under the majority's approach, such an obstacle could be overcome if it were clear that a
similarly impaired nonpregnant worker in that same job would have been accommodated. See id. at
1354.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1355.
153. See id.
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negative treatment of pregnant workers by an employer who acts not with a
conscious antipregnancy animus, but with an implicit or unconscious bias that
values pregnant workers less than workers affected by other conditions. Policies
like those of UPS stem not as much from an overt animus against pregnant
workers as from a failure to consider the needs of pregnant workers, or, when
considering them, to implicitly value those needs less than those of workers
encumbered by other conditions. Research on bias against working mothers
supports this understanding of employer intent, documenting "an underlying
schema that assumes a lack of competence and commitment when women are
viewed through the lens of motherhood and housework." 1 5 4 It is not pregnancy
per se that triggers negative reactions, but the combination of paid work and
pregnancy that triggers negative stereotypes.1 5 5 Cognitive bias that associates
pregnancy and motherhood with less competence at work and reduced commitment to the workplace shape employer judgments about the worth of pregnant
workers and working mothers.1 5 6 This bias may exist not as a conscious
assessment in the minds of decision makers, but as a stereotyped assumption
about the value of pregnant women as employees in relation to the burdens their
impending motherhood places on employers. 157
Employers have often overestimated the disruption to the workplace caused
by accommodating pregnant women, while underestimating the value of those
women as employees. Biased assessments of the costs and value of accommodating and protecting various classes of workers contributed to the very legal
landscape to which the PDA was responding. As Deborah Dinner has shown,
stereotypes and gendered ideologies about pregnant workers underlay the cost
assessments used to justify excising pregnancy from a broad range of labor
protections, such as unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and worker's compensation.15" Biased cost-benefit analyses based on stereotypes about
pregnant workers have continued to shape the scope of worker protections. 15 9 In

154. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD": Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1311, 1327 (2008).
155. See Michelle R. Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women:
Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards That Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1499, 1504 (2007) (finding store employees reacted positively to pregnant customers but
negatively to pregnant job applicants).
156. See Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty,
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1375 (2008) (summarizing studies on discrimination against pregnancy and
motherhood in the workplace).
157. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex DiscriminationSeriously, 91 DENVER U. L. REV. 995, 1010-13
(2015) (discussing stereotypes about women workers being less committed to work than family life).
158. See Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex
Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REv. 453, 475 (2014).
159. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
and the Amended Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 984-89, 1028 (2013)
(discussing the history of laws and private policies extending generous protection to a broad class of
workers but omitting pregnant workers based on biased cost-benefit assessments and interpreting the
PDA as ensuring that such cost-benefit analysis would be "conducted without the overlay of still
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the Young case itself, for example, the employer held fast to its policy of not
accommodating pregnancy even though Peggy Young's coworkers volunteered
to help her on the rare occasions that her job required any heavy lifting of
packages that would have been forbidden by her medical restriction.1 6 0 Any
disruption from permitting her to continue in her job with her lifting restrictions
would have been negligible or nonexistent.
After Young, employer policies reflecting such biased judgments about pregnant workers are more likely to be actionable under this hybrid disparate
treatment model than they would have been under the classic McDonnell
Douglas framework, in which the plaintiff must prove that the employer
intentionally proffered a false reason for its actions.1 6' Admittedly, the Young
opinion still uses the nomenclature of intentional discrimination. 16 2 However,
the proof that the Court accepts to support the inference of intentional discrimination does not align with a conclusion that the employer was consciously
aiming to burden pregnant women. Instead, the proof model is well-designed to
capture implicit bias. Describing the inference created by its newly minted
prima facie case, the Court invoked the language of causation rather than intent.
The Court explained that "an individual plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case by 'showing actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if
such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions
were based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under' Title VII." 1 6 3 Although
the Court leaves the PDA claim in the category of individual disparate treatment, a form of intentional discrimination, the contours of the category are
expanded in the process.
E. DEFENDING THE SHIFTED BOUNDARIES OF DISPARATE TREATMENT IN YOUNG

Setting aside Justice Scalia's caustic tone, 16 4 the dissent's critique of blurring
the boundary between disparate treatment and disparate impact aptly raises the
question of whether disparate impact would be the better avenue for challenging
employer policies based on implicit judgments about pregnant workers instead
of pushing the boundaries of disparate treatment.1 6 5 Before delving into that
question, it is worth noting that there is some lingering uncertainty about how
disparate impact doctrine intersects with the PDA. The majority pointedly noted

prevalent stereotypes and bias about the capacity of pregnant employees or the likelihood that pregnant
employees return to work after childbirth").

160. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015).
161. Id. at 1345.
162. Id. (stating that "liability in a disparate-treatment case depends on whether the protected trait
actually motivated the employer's decision" (citing Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52

(2003))).
163. Id. at 1354 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978)).
164. Id. at 1364 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It takes only a couple of waves of the Supreme Wand to
produce the desired result. Poof!").

165. Id. at 1365-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that Peggy Young did not bring a claim for disparate impact-an observation
that seems to indicate the Court's assumption that she could have done so.166
Justice Scalia's dissent, castigating the majority for treating as disparate treatment what should have been brought as a disparate impact claim, likewise
implicitly presumes the availability of disparate impact doctrine to challenge
facially neutral policies that have a disparate impact on pregnant workers.
Justice Kennedy's dissent goes further and explicitly acknowledges the availability of disparate impact challenges under the PDA.1 6 7 Justice Alito's concurring
opinion is more circumspect but might be read to mean that only disparate
treatment claims are available under the PDA.1 68
The strongest suggestion from a Justice that the disparate impact theory does
not apply to pregnancy came from Justice White in his dissent in a 1987 PDA
case. According to Justice White, clause two of the PDA forecloses disparate
impact claims that would otherwise prohibit an employer from using a facially
neutral practice that treats pregnant workers the same as other employees with
similarly limiting conditions. 16 9 A few lower courts have subscribed to this
view, reading clause two to require no more than the same treatment of pregnant
workers compared to others with similar work ability. 170 Even those courts that
have applied disparate impact doctrine to pregnancy claims have done so
sparingly, invoking various doctrines to cabin the claim and keep it from
requiring a restructuring of the workplace that would raise the level of treatment

166. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345.
167. Id. at 1367 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The PDA forbids not only disparate treatment but also
disparate impact, the latter of which prohibits 'practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact
have a disproportionate adverse effect."' (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009))).
168. See id. at 1356 (Alito, J. concurring) (stating that "[c]laims of discrimination under [clause one
of the PDA] require proof of discriminatory intent" and "all that matters is the employer's actual
intent").
169. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 298 n.1 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)
("The same clear language preventing preferential treatment based on pregnancy forecloses respondents' argument that the California provision can be upheld as a legislative response to leave policies
that have a disparate impact on pregnant workers. Whatever remedies Title VII would otherwise
provide for victims of disparate impact, Congress expressly ordered pregnancy to be treated in the same
manner as other disabilities.").
170. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply
disparate impact to claims "in which the plaintiff's only challenge is that the amount of sick leave
granted to employees is insufficient to accommodate the time off required in a typical pregnancy"
because "[t]o hold otherwise would transform the PDA into a guarantee of medical leave for pregnant
employees"); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing disparate
impact as a "permissible" theory for pregnancy discrimination claims as long as it is not applied to
grant pregnant workers "favoritism" or interfere with the ability of employers to treat pregnant workers
"as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees"); Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty.
Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 978, 983 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting disparate impact challenge to
employer's generally applicable leave policy and referencing amicus brief of the United States arguing
that the PDA's equal treatment mandate was intended to "eliminate the need for employees to rely on
disparate impact analysis to support their Title VII claims" (citation omitted)); Barrash v. Bowen, 846
F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988) (reversing lower court's finding that employer's leave policy had a
disparate impact based on pregnancy because the policy was entirely discretionary).

2017]

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

595

for pregnant employees. 171
Beyond the doctrinal hurdles of proceeding under a disparate impact theory,
the question of how to classify challenges to the unfavorable treatment of
pregnant workers goes to the heart of the dispute over what neutrality means
when it comes to pregnancy. The disparate impact claim was designed to reach
neutral practices with the unintended effect of disproportionately harming a
protected class absent a sufficiently strong justification. Conceptually distinct
from disparate impact theory, disparate treatment is the model for reaching
non-neutral practices that single out members of the protected class for unfavorable treatment. Pregnancy discrimination has never been easy for the Court to
classify in these categories because men are not encumbered by pregnancy and
no condition that affects men is precisely comparable to pregnancy. It is that
analogic crisis, and the Court's daft response to it in Gilbert, that prompted
Congress to enact the PDA. 17 2 Even after the enactment of the PDA, parsing
what neutrality means in this context requires a judgment about baselines: to
whom must the nondiscriminatory employer compare pregnant workers-to
those workers favored by the employer or to those workers disfavored by the
employer? The majority's approach in Young, fashioning the proof framework
under the rubric of disparate treatment, best identifies the need for discrimination law to probe what neutrality means in this setting. In contrast, putting the
claim under the disparate impact umbrella would mean accepting as pregnancyneutral any unfavorable treatment of pregnancy as long as its justification could
be articulated in a facially neutral way-including even the policy in Gilbert
favoring workers with illnesses and injuries. As the Young majority recognized,
rules that sound pregnancy-neutral are not necessarily neutral in their real-world
treatment of pregnant workers. 17 3 Disparate treatment best captures this understanding of pregnancy discrimination-that policies that selectively accommodate numerous other conditions besides pregnancy are not in fact "neutral," but

171. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
disparate impact claim under PDA because employers are not required to excuse pregnant employees
from satisfying legitimate requirements); Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting pregnancy-based disparate impact claim for failure to establish prima facie case); Lang v.
Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist.
212, 939 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting disparate impact claim because evidence failed to
show disproportionate impact on "teachers who experienced pregnancy-related disability"); Wilson v.
O'Grady-Peyton Int'l (USA), No. 407CV003, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24394, at *32-33 (S.D. Ga. Mar.
26, 2008) (finding plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence of a disproportionate impact on pregnant
woman concerning a policy requiring an overseas trip to earn commission); see also Selmi, supra note
66, at 749-51 (summarizing disparate impact case law under the PDA). But see L. Camille H6bert,
DisparateImpact and Pregnancy: Title VII's Other Accommodation Requirement, 24 J. GENDER, Soc.
PoL'Y & L. 107, 109 (2015) ("It is the disparate impact theory, rather than the disparate treatment
theory, in which Title VII's requirement to accommodate pregnancy is most likely to be found.").
172. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353.
173. Id. (describing the ability of even the employer in Gilbert to describe its policy of accommodated illnesses and accidents in pregnancy-neutral terms).
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rest on biased judgments about the worth of pregnant workers and the value of
retaining them.
Nonetheless, as the dissent correctly observed, then-existing disparate treatment doctrine did not dictate this result.1 7 4 What prompted the Court's newfound flexibility with McDonnell Douglas and its willingness to remodel the
disparate treatment claim in PDA claims? The Court's decision should be
understood as reflecting a shift in the contest over competing understandings
about what it means to discriminate on the basis of pregnancy and the circumstances under which it is unjust to treat pregnant workers worse than other
workers. The model that the Court crafted reflects a more expansive understanding about the meaning and prevalence of discrimination against pregnant workers. The majority's approach supplants the lower courts' narrow conception of
pregnancy discrimination as requiring pregnancy-based animus and the accompanying assumption that such discrimination is a rare and unusual phenomenon.
That perspective led lower courts to be skeptical of the likelihood that employers' refusals to accommodate pregnant workers reflected intentional discrimination. The more flexible framework crafted by the majority in Young reflects a
more expansive conception of pregnancy discrimination as encompassing unconscious bias-an understanding that invites a different expectation about the
likelihood of discerning pregnancy discrimination in today's workplace. 175
This change in the baseline view of what pregnancy discrimination is and its
prevalence in the workplace corresponds to heightened advocacy and activism
around the plight of pregnant workers. Women's rights groups have made the
treatment of pregnant workers a focal point in recent years, and new advocacy
groups have sprung up with singular focus on the treatment of pregnancy in the
workplace.1 7 6 Through compelling narratives of sympathetic women who want
to work but are forced out of their jobs upon becoming pregnant, often for lack
of minimal but necessary accommodations, the public dialogue about what
employers owe pregnant women has shifted. This advocacy has directly challenged the prevalent lens of "choice" that suggests that women's lower rates of

174. See id. at 1364-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. And yet, there are limits to the Court's embrace of a more progressive cultural understanding of
the rights of pregnant workers. The use of aberrational examples of employees who are more deserving
of favorable treatment-for example, an employee who demonstrates extraordinary heroism and is
injured in the process-reflects the stronghold of social norms that view having children as an
individual choice instead of a public good. See id. at 1349-50 (using such an example to argue against a
mechanical rule conferring "special treatment" and "most favored employee" status on pregnant
workers). This comparison implicitly views the workplace hero as acting for the good of others, in
contrast to the pregnant woman who made an individual choice in her private life to have children. Cf.
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify
Protection of "Real" Workers, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355 (2010) (discussing and critiquing cultural norms
that see women's childrearing and childbearing efforts as a product of individual choice instead of as a
public responsibility and a societal good).
176. See, e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness, A BETTER BALANCE, http://www.abetterbalance.org/ourcampaigns/pregnant-workers-fairness/ [https://perma.cc/KT3M-TNRF]; NAT'L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/ [https://perma.cc/WGQ2-DMV9].
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employment and pay after having children is a result of their own desires to
prioritize having children over paid employment. At the national level, a focal
point for this advocacy has been a proposed Pregnant Workers Fairness Act
(PWFA) that would require employers to offer reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy, modeled after the reasonable accommodation mandate in the ADA. 1 7 7
Although the bill has not generated enough support to have a realistic chance of
passing in the near future, it has drawn attention to the plight of pregnant
women and provided a vehicle for raising public awareness, spawning op-eds in
traditional media and dialogue in other media outlets.1 7 8 At the state level,
proposals modeled after the PWFA found a receptive audience in some state
legislatures, and a few states and localities now have laws guaranteeing such
protections. 17 9 These successes reflect the growing strength of a revitalized
social justice movement centered on the rights of pregnant workers and set the
stage for the Court's more expansive understanding of pregnancy discrimination
in Young.
One of the more puzzling facets of the Young decision is why the Court
remained so superficially attached to the formalities of the proof models in
reaching its interpretation of the PDA-an attachment that is particularly puzzling given that the Court ultimately departed from the classic proof framework
in significant ways. The majority began with the premise that Young's case was
based on "indirect evidence" and hence belongs on the McDonnell Douglas side
of the disparate treatment track.so Consistent with the trends in the lower courts
described above, the Court's opinion reads as if it had never decided Desert
Palace and as if "direct evidence" were still the gatekeeper separating 703(m)
motivating factor claims from the McDonnell Douglas proof framework. 8

177. See Emma Niles, Pregnant Workers FairnessAct Reintroduced in Congress, Ms. MAGAZINE
(June 5, 2015), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2015/06/05/congress-reintroduces-pregnant-workersfairness-act/ [https://perma.cc/M4WL-X9BH].
178. See, e.g., Janell Ross, How Feminists Can Win-By Treating Pregnancy Like a Temporary
Disability, WASH. POST (June 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/
05/how-feminists-can-win-by-treating-pregnancy-like-a-temporary-disability/ [https://perma.cc/P8Z3QG7K]; Gail Collins, The Woes of Working Women, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6,2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/12/06/opinion/gail-collins-the-woes-of-working-women.html?_r
0 [https://perma.cc/2CE624YN] (opinion piece discussing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act).
179. State and Local Action for Pregnant Worker Fairness, A BETTER BALANCE, http://www.
abetterbalance.org/web/ourissues/fairness-for-pregnant-workers/308- state-and-local-action-forpregnant-worker-fairness [https://perma.cc/8GRF-GM9A].
180. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015). But see Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-102 (2003) (holding that either direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient in
mixed-motive employment discrimination cases). See also Corbett, supra note 80, at 1696-98 (critiquing the majority opinion in Young for reasserting the direct/indirect distinction in contravention of
Desert Palace).
181. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345 (describing two distinct methods by which Young could prevail: "(1)
by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected
characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas"); id. at
1347 (attempting to separate Young's evidence into "direct evidence" and "evidence that she had made
out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas").
BLOG
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After labeling Young's case "indirect," the majority segued into McDonnell
Douglas, latching onto the familiar incantation of the three-stage, burdenshifting framework. 18 2 It proceeded to apply McDonnell Douglas in a novel
way, but maintained a veneer of consistency with the reminder that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was "not intended to be an inflexible rule." 183
It is curious that the Court leaned so heavily on McDonnell Douglas instead
of engaging in a more straightforward comparison between pregnant workers
and workers with similar work restrictions, particularly because the prima facie
case adds so little to the analysis. 18 4 Although it is the nature of judicial decision
making to reconcile new decisions with established precedents,1 "5 the Court
might have done better to set McDonnell Douglas aside as not well-designed for
the kind of comparative approach that the text of the PDA requires. Instead, the
Court held fast to McDonnell Douglas like a child with a favorite blanket.
And yet, reliance on McDonnell Douglas may have helped the Court see its
way clear to embrace a broader understanding of pregnancy discrimination. To
be sure, the McDonnell Douglas precedent did not resolve the conflict between
the majority and the dissent over how to define discrimination against pregnant
women when the employer accommodates some workers' conditions but not
pregnancy. But calling on the well-worn McDonnell Douglas mantra lent an
aura of familiarity and legitimacy to the Court's project of fashioning a more
flexible disparate treatment claim. More substantively, fastening the McDonnell
Douglas label onto the Court's carefully crafted PDA claim allowed the Court
to tap into the key sociological facts underlying the McDonnell Douglas proof
framework. As other scholars have pointed out, the McDonnell Douglas model
rests on a sociological judgment that ruling out some nondiscriminatory explanations (through the prima facie case) and the employer's proffered reason
(through proof of pretext) creates an inference of discrimination;
the power
of this inference rests on judges' implicit, unstated assumptions about what
discrimination is and its prevalence in the modern workplace. Judges, including
the Justices in the Young majority, might be less comfortable if they had to
explicitly articulate and justify these assumptions outright. And yet, courts'

182. Id. at 1345; see also id. at 1353 ("In our view, an individual pregnant worker who seeks to
show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell
Douglas framework.").
183. Id. at 1353 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978)).
184. See id. at 1354 (describing the elements of the prima facie case as follows: "that she belongs to
the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and
that the employer did accommodate others 'similar in their ability or inability to work"'); see also Ann
McGinley, Young v. UPS, Inc.: A Victory for Pregnant Employees?, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS
(Mar. 29, 2015), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-blog-ann-mcginley-young-v-ups-inc-a-victory-forpregnant-employees/ [https://perma.cc/SN4E-SKY9] (criticizing the Court for unnecessarily importing
the McDonnell Douglas framework into the PDA claim in Young).
185. Cf Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353 (insisting that its interpretation "is consistent with longstanding
interpretations of Title VII").
186. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let
Employment Discrimination Speakfor Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REv. 447 (2013).
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decisions in discrimination cases and the proof frameworks on which they rely
cannot be fashioned without underlying normative and empirical judgments
about what discrimination looks like and the likelihood of its existence. On the
need for such judgments, perhaps even the dissenting Justices in Young might
agree. 18 7 Although a critic might question whether judicial assumptions about
the prevalence of discrimination should be embedded in the fashioning of
doctrinal rules-instead of judges articulating their underlying commitments
more transparently-legal doctrine has long served this function and it is not at
all clear that our legal system would have greater integrity if it were otherwise. 8 8
By relying on McDonnell Douglas, albeit in a novel way, the Court constructed a bridge of continuity in the development of employment discrimination law. Borrowing the empirical judgments that have been at the foundation of
Title VII's individual disparate treatment claim since McDonnell Douglas was
decided in 1973, the Young framework bears a kinship with an established proof
structure with a respectable pedigree, even if it is in actuality a distant cousin
instead of a close sibling. The formality of the four-part prima facie case,
followed by the burden-shifting framework heading toward the ultimate question of pretext, calls forth a familiarity that gives courts permission to find
discrimination through inferential proof. Although the Court treads new ground
in adapting this disparate treatment proof framework to the pregnancy accommodation setting, it hoists the PDA claim onto the shoulders of its most venerable
proof framework, reminding us in the process that McDonnell Douglas too was
once a novel judicial invention.
This new PDA model will not, in itself, determine the outcomes of the
pregnancy discrimination cases to follow, but its assemblage and embrace
by the majority in Young both reflects and reinforces an increased judicial
receptivity to viewing the different treatment of pregnant workers as a form of
intentional discrimination-broadly understood to encompass unconscious stereotyping and implicit bias-and to remedying it through disparate treatment
law. It is this development in Young-the Court's more expansive understanding
of what it means to intentionally discriminate against pregnant workers-that
marks the decision's most significant contribution.18 9

187. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes rested explicitly on
assumptions about the meaning and prevalence of discrimination. See 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011) ("[L]eft
to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and surely most managers in a corporation
that forbids sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.").
188. For an argument that legal doctrine plays a valuable role in our legal system despite its
indeterminacy and obfuscation of judicial choices and judges' underlying assumptions, see Jessie Allen,
Empirical Doctrine, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 47-48 (2015) (contending that even if doctrine is
indeterminate, it may have positive "psychological and social effects on decision makers" by "bracketing their ordinary subjective perspectives" and enhancing "what psychologists call 'theory of mind"').
189.

Cf. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL

MOBLIZATION

102 n. 14 (1994) (concluding, from his case studies of the pay equity movement, that the
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The big question after Young is what potential, if any, the decision holds for
the development of employment discrimination law outside of the PDA. To be
sure, the Court itself stopped short of suggesting any such implications. After
fashioning its new PDA proof framework, the Court quickly cabined it as
"limited to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act context." 90 And yet, other than
this bare assertion, it is not clear why the logic of the Young framework should
remain wholly encapsulated within the PDA. The PDA's distinctively comparatordriven text in clause two, mandating the same treatment as a set of specified
comparators, might have provided a basis for interpreting the PDA differently
from the rest of Title VII. But the Court foreclosed that possibility when it fell
back on McDonnell Douglas and the individual disparate treatment framework
as the structure for housing the PDA claim. Moreover, although the language of
clause two does not appear elsewhere in Title VII in that precise form, the
PDA's comparator-driven logic is not unique to the PDA. As discussed previously, the treatment of otherwise similarly situated comparators is often central
in individual disparate treatment cases. Indeed, the importance of comparatordriven proof in establishing intentional discrimination was endorsed by the
Court in McDonnell Douglas itself.191
Although logic does not support limiting the Court's reasoning to the PDA
setting, it would require a much bolder reading of Young than I am prepared to
give to discern in the case a general endorsement of inferring discriminatory
intent from impact-style proof, or of easing up on the strictness of comparator
proof, or of equating discriminatory intent with implicit bias in the run of cases.
The argument that this Article puts forward is more modest: for reasons that will
be elaborated below, the equal pay claim is an auspicious area for a disparate
treatment claim to develop along parallel lines to those drawn by the Court in
Young. In making this argument, I do not mean to foreclose or in any way
discourage planting the seeds of Young more broadly or in other discrete areas
of employment discrimination. 1 92 Rather, I argue below that there are similarities between the structure of the pregnancy and pay claims, and the social
support for broadening the understanding of the kinds of discrimination that the
claims reach, that make the equal pay claim fertile ground for the Young hybrid
to take root. Like the PDA claim, proof of discrimination in an equal pay claim
is established by the different treatment of a circumscribed class of comparators. And, as with pregnancy discrimination, recently reinvigorated advocacy
and activism are successfully contesting traditional gender ideologies about the

general political direction of judicial change is more important in mobilizing rights than the certainty of
success through litigation).
190. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355.
191. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) ("Especially relevant to such a
showing [of pretext] would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of
comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless retained or rehired.").
192. Such an agenda is, however, outside the scope of this Article.
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meaning of pay discrimination and the extent to which it occurs in the modern
workplace.
III.

LESSONS FROM

YOUNG: A

PATH FORWARD FOR EQUAL PAY CLAIMS

This Part explores the possibilities for borrowing from the Young framework
in fashioning the equal pay claim, whether through judicial construction or
legislative enactment of the Paycheck Fairness Act, by importing a business
justification test into the "factor other than sex" (FOTS) defense. It points out
that such a move in pay discrimination case law has already begun to take hold
in some lower courts and discusses the similarities between the pay and
pregnancy discrimination claims that make this a promising turn. It then defends stretching the boundaries of disparate treatment in pay discrimination
claims along the lines of the Court's refashioned disparate treatment claim in
Young. Before any of this, however, some background on the state of employment discrimination law as it regulates pay discrimination, and the recent
controversies that are reshaping the field, is in order.
A. TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT: OVERLAPPING COVERAGE OF SEX-BASED PAY
DISCRIMINATION

Pay discrimination is prohibited by two federal statutes that overlap significantly in their coverage of sex-based pay discrimination. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, among other types of discriminatory employment
practices, discrimination in compensation, a ban that applies to all of the
statute's protected classes: race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.1 9 3
Enacted one year earlier, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) prohibits paying an
employee less than an employee of another sex for performing substantially the
same work under similar work conditions unless it falls within one of four
statutory defenses. 1 94 So although the EPA is limited to sex discrimination, Title
VII protects a broader range of protected classes. However, because Title VII
incorporates by amendment the EPA defenses (explained below), Title VII's
treatment of sex-based pay discrimination largely tracks that of the EPA,
although its treatment of pay discrimination against other protected classes does
not.
The EPA codified four affirmative defenses to pay disparities that would
otherwise violate the Act. 1 95 Of these, the most relevant today is known as the
FOTS defense, which authorizes a pay disparity that would otherwise violate

193. See 42 U.S.C.
194. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2 (2012).
§ 206(d) (2012). The EPA

grew out of a 1945 ruling by a federal administrative

board overseeing the payment of military contractors that the pay practices of General Electric and
Westinghouse discriminated against women. Although the board was dismantled soon after this ruling,
the decision sparked activism by unions and women's groups for greater legal protections from pay
discrimination. See MCCANN, supra note 188, at 49.
195. The EPA authorizes a pay differential that would otherwise violate the Act if "such payment is
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
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the Act if it was made pursuant to "a differential based on any other factor other
than sex." 1 96 After the House passed the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Senate passed a floor amendment to Title VII known as the Bennett
Amendment, which was intended to reconcile the Title VII and the EPA in their
coverage of sex-based pay discrimination. 1 97 It did so by incorporating the
EPA's defenses into Title VII claims for sex-based pay discrimination.1 9 8 It
states that it is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII "to
differentiate upon the basis of sex" in determining wages or compensation "if
such differentiation is authorized by" the EPA.199 As a result, unlike Title VII's
treatment of pay discrimination based on protected classes other than sex, Title
VII gives employers a defense for paying otherwise discriminatory wages
where the differential is based on a factor other than the employee's sex. Hence,
the FOTS defense applies to sex-based pay discrimination claims under both
Title VII and the EPA.
There is one difference in the two statutes' coverage of sex-based pay
discrimination, although this difference sounds more consequential in theory
than it is in practice. The EPA prohibits only the paying of unequal wages to a
man and woman performing substantially equal work. The EPA does not cover
pay discrimination that undervalues women for a discriminatory reason without
proof of a male comparator who is paid more for doing substantially the same
work. Title VII, on the other hand, does not limit its coverage of pay discrimination to the unequal-pay-for-equal-work set of facts. It is possible to prevail on a
Title VII pay discrimination claim by proving that the plaintiff was paid less for
a discriminatory reason, even if no opposite-sex comparator was paid more for
doing that work.20 0 Under Title VII, regardless of whether there was unequal
pay for equal work, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent. Under the
EPA, there is no separate proof of intent required beyond proof of unequal pay
for equal work. This difference in the required showing of discriminatory intent

quality or quantity of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(i).
196. Id. § 206(d)(1)(iv).
197. See Pamela L. Perry, Let Them Become Professionals:An Analysis of the Failure to Enforce
Title VII's Pay Equity Mandate, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 127, 160-61 & n.140 (1991) (discussing the
legislative history of the Bennett Amendment).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012) ("It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title
VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by
the provisions of [the EPA]."); Cty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1981) (interpreting the
Bennett Amendment to incorporate the affirmative defenses codified in the EPA into Title VII sex-based
pay discrimination claims).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
200. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 163-66, 180-81 (holding that Title VII prohibits intentional pay
discrimination without requiring proof of equal work, whereas the EPA requires proof of substantially
similar work; female prison guards bringing Title VII pay discrimination claim were not required to
prove that they performed the same job as higher-paid male prison guards where the county had ignored
its own market data in setting the female guards' lower wages, supporting an inference that they were
paid less because of their sex).
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is often heralded as a significant divergence in the two statutes. In practice,
however, it is less significant than it appears on first blush, for two reasons.
First, although Title VII has a potentially broader reach than the EPA because
it is not limited to the unequal pay for equal work framework, the difficulty of
proving discriminatory intent without a higher-paid comparator doing essentially the same job makes Title VII's application to pay discrimination outside
of that framework limited in practice. The Supreme Court's decisions in Ledbetter and Wal-Mart reflect an implicit assumption that the discriminatory intent in
a Title VII pay claim means a conscious decision by the employer to pay a
woman less because of her sex.201 Where the employer pays a woman less than
a man for doing equal work, courts may infer the discriminatory intent from the
unexplained difference in pay. But without proof of unequal pay for equal work,
proof of discriminatory intent will be more elusive. The bottom line is that,
although Title VII reaches a potentially broader range of discriminatory pay
practices, in practical effect both statutes cover largely the same ground because
Title VII's discriminatory intent requirement limits it from having much of an
impact outside of the unequal pay for equal work setting.
Second, although the EPA is a "strict liability" statute in the sense that the
proscribed pay differential violates the statute without any proof of the employer's intent to discriminate, in practice the FOTS defense, when applied broadly
by courts to allow any sex-neutral factor to justify a pay gap, functions as
tantamount to a discriminatory intent standard. So, although Title VII's coverage of sex-based pay discrimination is potentially both broader in that it is not
limited to unequal pay for equal work fact patterns and narrower because it
requires proof of discriminatory intent, in practice the two statutes are more
similar in scope than they are different.2 02 Both statutes are also plagued by the
same doctrinal hurdles, which are discussed next.
B. THE LIMITS OF THE EQUAL PAY CLAIM: TIGHTLY CIRCUMSCRIBED COMPARATORS AND
OPEN-ENDED FACTORS OTHER THAN SEX

Pay discrimination cases often falter in courts for reasons similar to those that
bedeviled the pre-Young PDA cases: courts require strict similarity of comparators and allow employers to assert a neutral reason for the different treatment to
dispel any inference of discrimination. The first obstacle is reflected in courts'
strict approaches to determining whether jobs are similar enough for the differ201. See Brake, supra note 60, at 662-63 (interpreting the Ledbetter decision as equating pay
discrimination with a conscious intent to pay a woman less because of her sex); Deborah Thompson
Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 NEw ENG. L. REV.
229, 232 (2012) (explaining the Court's theory of pay discrimination in the Wal-Mart case as requiring
a search for a conscious intent to pay women less because of sex).

202. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 659 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that although Title VII pay discrimination claims require proof of intentional
discrimination and the EPA does not, the "practical effect" of the difference is merely that under Title
VII the plaintiff has the burden to prove gender was the reason for the pay disparity, whereas under the
EPA the employer has the burden to prove that it was not by asserting the FOTS defense).
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ent payment of women and men holding them to establish a violation. Legal
scholar Deborah Eisenberg has so thoroughly mined this dimension of the equal
pay case law that I will not attempt to add to her analysis here, but will reiterate
her finding that equal pay claims are often derailed by courts' requirement of
strict similarity between jobs or even identical jobs.20 3
The second challenge to successfully bringing pay discrimination claims
comes from the FOTS defense. Depending on how broadly it is construed, this
defense has the potential to unravel altogether the comparator-driven model of
the pay discrimination claim. When broadly interpreted, the defense severely
restricts the scope of the equal pay claim even when comparators hold similar
enough jobs to otherwise establish a violation. If any factor other than sex,
however flimsy, can justify paying women less, then the defense effectively
turns the claim into a search for discriminatory intent.
The Supreme Court's early case law took a narrow enough approach to the
defense to permit redress under the EPA without becoming hamstrung by the
employer's motivation for paying women less. 2 0 4 However, in the intervening
decades, some lower courts have expansively applied the FOTS defense without
any meaningful scrutiny of the business justification behind the employer's
reason or even any assurance that the employer had any business-related reason
at all.20 5 More recently, the Supreme Court, in dicta in a case dealing with age
discrimination but referencing the EPA by analogy, appeared to back off from
its earlier, narrower approach to the FOTS.2 06 The effect of such an unconstrained FOTS defense is to exonerate any pay disparity that can be explained in
sex-neutral terms. Under such a broad application of the defense, even the

203. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act's Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L.
REv. 17, 39-41 (2010) (surveying the lower courts' case law and demonstrating the strictness of the
substantially similar work requirement in EPA claims).

204. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 200-01 (1974) (dictum) (describing the
FOTS defense as requiring a "legitimate" justification for a pay disparity (citation omitted)).

205. See, e.g., Maron v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 508 F. App'x 226, 232-33 (4th Cir.
2013) (holding that employer carries its burden on FOTS by proving that any factor other than sex more

likely than not motivated the pay disparity); Wemsing v. Dep't of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468-70
(7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that court should scrutinize the legitimacy of the
employer's reason and holding that the FOTS permits any non-sex reason, not just good business
reasons, as a defense); Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 718 (8th Cir. 2003) (accepting salary retention
policy as a FOTS and refusing to examine employer's business justification for the policy because any
sex-neutral factor will establish the defense); Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598,
614-15 (4th Cir. 1999) (construing the FOTS defense to permit any sex-neutral factor to justify a wage

gap); Looper v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., No. 12-CV-393-WMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62056, at *27-28 (W.D. Wis. May 12, 2015) (holding that whether employer's reason is a good
business practice is irrelevant as long as it is sex-neutral).

206. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 & n. 11 (2005) (plurality opinion) (holding in
ADEA case that the "reasonable factor other than age" (RFOA) provision supports recognition of
disparate impact age claims and noting that in contrast to the RFOA, in the EPA, "Congress barred
recovery if a pay differential was based 'on any other factor'-reasonable or unreasonable-'other than
sex').
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employer's own mistake in setting pay can suffice as a factor other than sex.207
The upshot is, left unconstrained by any scrutiny of the employer's business
justification for paying women less, the FOTS defense operates as a backdoor
requirement of discriminatory intent in order to establish a violation of the Act.
With a broad and unconstrained FOTS defense, the EPA-and Title VII, by
extension, because of the Bennett Amendment-will continue to fail to reach
the core of the problem of discriminatory pay: the devaluation of women's work
and the infiltration of implicit bias into discretionary pay-setting decisions.20 8
Rather than a deliberate decision to pay women less, women's lower pay often
stems from implicit judgments devaluing the worth of women workers.20 9 Men
tend to be evaluated more highly-even when men and women perform equally
well-for tasks that align with masculine stereotypes such as competence and
leadership.2 10 Moreover, when women perform in ways counter to gender
stereotypes, such as by attempting to negotiate pay, they are penalized more
harshly than men for the same behaviors.2 1 1 Unless the equal pay claim sweeps
broadly enough to capture paying women less for the same work, whether or
not traceable to a conscious intent to discriminate, it will do little to narrow the
gender wage gap.
C. TIGHTENING THE "FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX" LOOPHOLE BY SCRUTINIZING THE
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS REASONS FOR PAYING WOMEN LESS

The harsh effects of the FOTS defense have been the focal point of recent
advocacy to reshape the EPA, and by extension Title VII, into a better vehicle
for addressing pay discrimination. The reform that has gained the most traction
would alter the defense so that not just any sex-neutral factor will work, but
only those supported by a sufficiently weighty business justification. A key
provision in the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA), which has been repeatedly introduced in Congress in recent years, would narrow the FOTS defense by
incorporating a business necessity standard that would permit only those sex-

207. See Boaz v. Fed. Express Corp., 107 F. Supp. 3d 861, 885 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2015)
(employer's mistaken application of a job classification system was a FTOS).
208. See LINDA BABCOCK &

SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN

DON'T ASK: THE HIGH

COST

OF AVOIDING

NEGOTIATION-AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 98-100, 119-20 (2007) (reviewing literature and
concluding that employers place a lower value on women workers and pay them less without realizing
that they are doing so).

209. See Melissa J. Williams, Elizabeth Levy Paluck & Julie Spencer-Rodgers, The Masculinity of
Money: Automatic Stereotypes Predict Gender Diferences in Estimated Salaries, 34 PSYCHOL. OF
WOMEN Q. 7 (2010); see also Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 234; Schultz, supra note 157, at 1004
(identifying sex stereotypes underlying unequal pay).
210. See Charles B. Craver, If Women Don'tAsk: Implicationsfor BargainingEncounters, the Equal

Pay Act, and Title VIA 102 MICH. L. REV. 1104, 1118, 1122-24 (2004) (book review) (discussing the
problem of subconscious bias in setting men's and women's pay).
211. Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Women at the BargainingTable: Pitfalls and Prospects,25 NEGOT J.
233 (2009) (discussing subconscious biases women face at work when negotiating salaries); see also

Michelle A. Travis, Disabling the Gender Pay Gap: Lessons from the Social Model of Disability, 91
DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 917-918 (2014) (summarizing evidence of gender bias in pay negotiations).
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neutral factors that are job-related and consistent with business necessity to
justify a pay disparity.2 12 Even without passage of the PFA, some lower courts
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have moved in
that direction, interpreting the FOTS defense to require judicial scrutiny of the
business reasons behind an asserted sex-neutral reason for the pay disparity,
effectively incorporating a version of a business necessity analysis into the pay
discrimination claim.2 13
This move to tighten up the FOTS defense is not without controversy.
Whether the focus is on the proposed PFA, or the judicial opinions interpreting
the defense to require a sufficiently strong business justification for the explanatory factor, the criticism falls into two camps. First and most prominently,
critics contend that scrutinizing the employer's business justification for the
FOTS blurs the boundary between disparate treatment and disparate impact,
effectively transforming the equal pay claim into a disparate impact claim.214
Second, some supporters of strengthening equal pay claims have questioned the
usefulness of an equal pay strategy that fixates on the FOTS defense. They
contend that tightening up the FOTS defense will likely accomplish little, given
how tightly courts rein in comparators in equal pay cases before even reaching

212. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 862, 114th Cong. (2015); see also The Paycheck FairnessAct:
Major Provisions, AM. BAR Ass'N (June 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal
uncategorized/GAO/2015junl pfaprovisions.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.ccIZS94-T75P];David
S. Joachim, Senate RepublicansBlock Bill on Equal Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/04/10/us/politics/senate-republicans-block-bill-on-equal-pay.htmlr= 0 [https://perma.cc/
MYP9-26EQ].
213. See, e.g., Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting job reclassification as FOTS unless employer demonstrates it is rooted in "legitimate business-related differences in
work responsibilities and qualifications for the particular positions at issue" (quoting Aldrich v.
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992))); Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129,
136-39 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring FOTS to demonstrate a legitimate business reason); Dreves v. Hudson
Grp. (HG) Retail, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82636, at *23-27 (D. Vt. June 12,
2013) (rejecting inducement, negotiation, and family dislocation as insufficiently business-related to
meet the FOTS defense); Sandor v. Safe Horizon, Inc., No. 08-CV-4636 (ILG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3346, at *43-44 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2011) (requiring employer asserting experience as a FOTS to show
both that the experience is job-related for the position in question and that the employer actually based
the comparator's higher salary on this factor); Siler v. First State Bank, No. 04-1161-t-An, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 46200, at *6-9 (W.D. Tenn. July 28, 2005) (rejecting employer's subjective evaluation of
male comparator as having greater potential to enhance the business, interpersonal skills, and prior
salary history as factors other than sex, and requiring a FOTS "at a minimum" to rely on a legitimate
business reason (citation omitted)); see also Eisenberg, supra note 201, at 261 ("A majority of federal
circuits and the [EEOC] have held that [the FOTS] defense must be job-related and adopted for a
legitimate business reason.").
214. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Choices, Bias, and the Value of the Paycheck FairnessAct:
A Response Essay, 29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 429, 443 (2014) (criticizing the PFA's allowance of
unlimited compensatory and punitive damages because "it would be the only federal employment
discrimination statute" allowing damages for a claim "akin to disparate impact"); Gary Siniscalco et al.,
The Pay Gap, the Glass Ceiling, and Pay Bias: Moving Forward Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act,
29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 395, 419 (2014) (characterizing the PFA as adopting a disparate impact
model for equal pay claims).
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the FOTS defense.2 15 In both instances, insights from the Young decision can
help respond to these objections.
D. TAKING A PAGE FROM YOUNG: UNJUSTIFIED IMPACT AS THE PATH TO DISPARATE
TREATMENT IN PAY

Probing the shifting sands of disparate treatment and disparate impact in
Young and its fellow travelers can clear a path for expanding the disparate
treatment model's reach in equal pay claims. Contrary to critics' assertions,
refashioning the FOTS defense to incorporate a more rigorous scrutiny of
purportedly sex-neutral justifications would not represent an unprecedented
merger of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Rather, it would
remodel the disparate treatment claim to better capture unconscious stereotyping and implicit bias in pay-setting decisions instead of restricting equal pay law
to a narrower ban of only those pay disparities that can be attributed to a
deliberate intent to pay women less. Without this move, a broad and open-ended
FOTS defense functions to turn the disparate treatment pay claim into a search
for a conscious discriminatory intent. If any FOTS, however insubstantial, can
justify paying women less than men for doing the same work, the FOTS
operates as a backdoor intent requirement, prohibiting only those pay disparities
that cannot be explained by any sex-neutral motive, however lacking in a
plausible business rationale. 2 16 A more narrowly drawn FOTS defense that
requires courts to scrutinize the business justifications behind the employer's
sex-neutral explanation would better enable the EPA to capture pay disparities
that reflect unconscious stereotyping and implicit bias that devalue women and
not just the conscious intent to pay women less because they are women.
Although the debate continues over the extent to which women's pay is
suppressed by discrimination-and this Article can just barely scratch the
surface of that debate-the evidence unequivocally shows that at least some
portion of the gender wage gap is attributable to women being paid less than
men for substantially similar work. 2 17 Even after accounting for sex-neutral
factors such as job type, qualifications, age, industry, hours worked, and attach-

215. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse of

Summary Judgment in Equal Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 815, 835 (2012-2013) (observing that
amending the FOTS defense does nothing to solve biggest problem in equal pay cases: proving the
prima facie case); Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay

Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 206-08 (2011) (contending that the PEA will not
provide a remedy for unequal pay for most women, including and especially professional women,
because of the tightness of the comparators required to prove a violation, but nevertheless expressing
tepid support for the PEA because a partial solution is better than none).
216. This is consistent with the understanding of the EPA claim that Justice Ginsburg articulated in
her Ledbetter dissent, in which she identified the key difference between Title VII and the EPA as which
party carries the burden of proving that an identified pay disparity is or is not intentionally discriminatory-the plaintiff in Title VII and the defendant, through the FOTS defense, in the EPA. Ledbetter v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 659 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217. See Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond The Paycheck FairnessAct: Mandatory Wage Disclosure
Laws-A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 385,
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ment to the labor force, a significant gender wage gap remains. 2 18 The plaintiffs' experts in the nationwide lawsuit against Wal-Mart used the data in that
case to tell a similar story: controlling for seniority, weeks worked during the
year, full-time or part-time work, job position, job review rating, and numerous
other factors, women at all levels and in all regions received significantly less
pay.219 Much research suggests that gender stereotyping plays an important role
in explaining the gender wage gap.220 Studies have shown, for example, that
subjects set pay at a higher rate when presented with resumes containing male
names and at a lower rate when shown otherwise identical resumes with female
names. 2 2 1 There is no evidence suggesting that all or even most of these
subjects consciously decided to set a lower wage for the women candidates or
were aware they were doing so.
Detractors of the gender wage gap cite the widening of the gap during
women's prime childbearing and parenting years, pointing out that the wage gap
is smaller when women first enter the labor market and widens over time.22 2 In
light of this progression, they conclude that the wage gap reflects women's
choices to step back from the wage labor market and prioritize childrearing and
family responsibilities. 223 And yet, the gender wage gap is greatest for those
women who "lean in"-women with the highest education and professional

404-06 (2013) (summarizing the literature and demonstrating the inability of nondiscriminatory
explanations to explain away the gender wage gap).
218. See, e.g., NAT'L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, FwrY YEARS AFTER THE EQUAL PAY ACT: ASSESSING THE
PAST, TAKING STOCK OF THE FUTURE 6 (2013); CHRISTIANNE CORBETT & CATHERINE HILL, AM. Assoc. OF
UNIv. WOMEN, GRADUATING TO A PAY GAP: THE EARNINGS OF WOMEN AND MEN ONE YEAR AFTER COLLEGE

20-21 (2012) (finding a 7% unexplained pay gap after accounting for factors such as
occupational choice and hours worked); see also Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the
Gap: Reflections on 20 Years Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 F.l.U. L. REV.
515, 532-33 (2013) (examining data from the longitudinal study of lawyers' pay in the "After the JD"
study and finding it unable to explain the gender pay disparity for lawyers by the number of hours
worked or other non-gender variables).
219. See Eisenberg, supra note 200, at 240-41. The gap also increased over the worker's career; for
example, among new hourly wage workers, men earned $0.35/hour more when hired, but the gap grew
to $1.16/hour five years later. Id. at 241.
220. See Sterling & Reichman, supra note 217, at 533 (discussing research showing that genderlinked "cultural schema profoundly influence the assessment of competence, commitment, and performance" that affect lawyer's pay).
221. See Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the Review of the CurriculaVitae of Job
Applicants and Tenure Candidates:A NationalEmpiricalStudy, 41 SEX ROLES 509, 518-20 (1999).
222. See, e.g., Siniscalco et al., supra note 213, at 407-13. Although the gap widens over time, a
substantial gender wage gap is present even in entry-level hiring. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISORS, GENDER PAY GAP: RECENT TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONs 4 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/equal pay issue brief final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7AK-KK57]; Anthony T. Lo
Sasso et al., The $16,819 Pay Gap for Newly Trained Physicians: The Unexplained Trend of Men
Earning More than Women, 30 HEALTH AFF. 193, 196 (2011) (finding this gap while accounting for
numerous other variables likely to affect wages).
223. See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 2 (2010) (responding to arguments attributing women's lower earnings to the "choices" women
make about balancing work and family life).
GRADUATION
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status and who work the greatest number of hours. 2 24 The many wage gap
studies that account for hours worked and labor force attachment-comparing
only full-time paid work over a period of years-tell a different story from the
".women choose family over work" narrative: that the childbearing and childrearing years are a flashpoint for bias against women that affects pay.2 2 5 Researchers have found that women with families are subjected to a double standard that
judges mothers more harshly than fathers on amorphous criteria like commitment to work, for example.226 Under such a double standard, men who leave
work during the workday for family or personal reasons are assumed to have
gone to a meeting, while women's temporary absences are presumed to stem
from family obligations that interfere with their work.22 7 In discretionary
pay-setting regimes, such biases-which may be deeply ingrained and not
necessarily conscious-have free reign. Even seemingly neutral explanations
for pay disparities may actually be the product of biased schemas; for example,
a woman might be paid less ostensibly because of her lower billable hours, but
the lower billing might itself be a product of a reduction in work assignments
resulting from her manager's stereotyped predictions about her lesser availabil8
ity and commitment to work. 2 2

Another common and ostensibly neutral explanation for pay disparities is to
point to "the market" to justify how employers value their employees.22 9
However, employer suppositions about the market are frequently based on
assumptions about employee worth rather than rigorous market research.2 30
Allusions to the market often mask embedded preconceptions about marketability that place a higher value on male workers. 2 3 1 Although rationales relying on

224. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-BasedApproach to
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIz. ST. L.J. 951, 973-77 (2011).
225. See Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 273, 281-82, 291 (2003).
226. See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penaltyfor Motherhood, 66 AM. Soc. REv.
204, 220 (2001) (suggesting part of wage gap may result from discrimination); Sue Shellenbarger, The
"Maternal Wall": Employer Bias Against Working Women, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2009), http:/Iblogs.
wsj.com/juggle/2009/12/03/the-maternal-wall-employer-bias-against-working-women/ [http://perma.cc/
9U5R-ZNYD] (describing study finding supervisors perceived female employees as having greater
work-family conflicts and resulting interference with their jobs compared to male employees "regardless of their actual caregiving duties").
227. See, e.g., Sterling & Reichman, supra note 217, at 529 (discussing the gendered nature of
"impression management" of a lawyer's availability in the legal profession).
228. See id. at 529-30.
229. See MCCANN, supra note 188, at 40-41 (discussing the ease with which employers defend pay
discrimination claims by invoking "a 'free market' defense at every turn" and how that argument
resonates with judges' assumptions that "discrimination is the rare exception rather than the norm").
230. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 579, 599 (2001); see also
Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 990 ("In the absence of a professional compensation survey, analyzed by
a professional compensation consultant, 'market' wages are simply an employer's hunch about what the
position is worth.").
231. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 214, at 184-95 (discussing the schemas that lead employers
to undervalue the market worth of their female employees and cause women workers to undervalue
their own worth).
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market value may sound gender-neutral, they can incorporate gender-biased
evaluations of employee worth.2 32 Unless the FOTS defense is reined in to
scrutinize the business justifications behind allusions to market value, acceptance of such explanations will place pay decisions reflecting implicit bias and
unconscious stereotypes outside of the law's reach.2 33 Insights from the framework adopted in Young can help explain the need for courts to scrutinize the
weight of the employer's reasons for using a pay-setting factor that disfavors
women.
At the other end of the political spectrum, a more progressive critique of the
FOTS reform strategy would question the usefulness of incorporating a business
necessity test for the employer's justification because the claim may well falter
for lack of a sufficient comparator before the court even turns to the FOTS
defense. On this point, there is genuine reason for concern. Like the PDA, the
heart of the equal pay claim is proving discrimination through the different
treatment of comparators. Lower courts have approached job comparisons in
equal pay claims with notorious rigidity, requiring proof of unequal payment of
persons in virtually identical jobs in order to meet the plaintiff's burden of
proof.2 3 4 Judicial anxiety about comparable worth seems to haunt the courts'
approach to defining the appropriate comparators for unequal pay, causing them
to allow even minute differences in the jobs performed to undermine the
pertinence of the comparison.23 5
Here too, lessons from Young can help respond to this concern. The shift
away from the search for a conscious intent and toward an unjustified burden
analysis could nudge courts away from a rigid approach to comparators. Tightening the FOTS defense by directing courts away from focusing on the motive
behind a pay differential could signal to judges that total similarity between
comparators is beside the point.23 6 Tightening the FOTS defense to require

232. See MCCANN, supra note 188, at 241 n.14 (detailing how wage-setting practices are often
insulated from market pressures of supply and demand and that market justifications often lack
empirical support).
233. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 214, at 162-66 (exposing the gender bias in the most
common "market excuses" employers use to justify a pay disparity-reliance on prior salary, matching
of an outside offer, and differences in employees' willingness to negotiate pay-and explaining why
greater scrutiny of these business justifications under the PEA is needed).
234. See Eisenberg, supra note 202, at 39-41 (discussing and critiquing the strictness with which
courts approach the determination of substantially equal work under the EPA).
235. See, e.g., Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court, 392 F.3d 151, 170 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that courts refuse to broaden comparator-jobs if it would require "a subjective assessment of different
positions with different duties" (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1333 (N.D.
Ill. 1986))). Allowing plaintiffs to use hypothetical comparators might be one way out of this
problem-an approach that some other legal systems have experience implementing. See Goldberg,
supra note 8, at 805 (noting that England and the European Union allow this); see also Sandra
Fredman, Reforming Equal Pay Laws, 37 INDUS. L.J. 193, 200 (2008) (explaining the use of data and
experts in UK law to determine hypothetical male comparators' pay); lain Steele, Note, Beyond Equal
Pay?, 37 INDUS. L.J. 119, 123 (2008).
236. For a relatively generous interpretation of the substantial similarity of jobs along these lines,
see Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 338 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2003) (focusing on similarities
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scrutiny of employer business justifications would broaden the law's conceptualization of pay discrimination to encompass stereotyping and implicit bias, not
just the conscious intent to pay women less because they are women. This shift
should change the ultimate inference courts seek to find through their reliance
on comparators. If the comparison's purpose is to prove a conscious intent to
discriminate, any dissimilarity between the comparators could defeat that inference. But if the proof framework is tilted away from a focus on conscious
intent, the comparison might be more flexibly applied. In other words, if the
different treatment of comparators no longer must support an inference of
conscious intent to under-pay women because they are women, courts might
ease up on the degree of similarity required for comparators. By incorporating a
business justification test into the FOTS, the equal pay model would move away
from a narrow view of pay discrimination as the conscious underpayment of
women. Refashioning the claim at the back-end by tightening up the FOTS
defense should prompt courts to ease up on the comparison at the front end by
reshaping their understanding of what the comparator-driven model is looking
for.
Importantly, and similar to the PDA claim in Young, refashioning the FOTS
defense to incorporate a business justification analysis should not be understood
to push the equal pay claim over the edge of disparate treatment and into
disparate impact terrain. Despite the tightening of the FOTS defense to scrutinize the employer's reasons for paying women less, the equal pay claim still
registers in our doctrinal categories-fuzzy though they are-as a disparate
treatment claim. The different treatment of a defined class of similarly situated
comparators remains the starting point, followed by testing the business justification behind an employer's sex-neutral explanation so that the claim reaches
beyond conscious intent to capture unconscious stereotyping and implicit bias.
Scrutinizing the business necessity for the employer's explanation would serve
the same function in equal pay claims as it did in Young.
As with the PDA claim that the Court refashioned in Young, it is fair to ask
whether disparate impact doctrine would be a better vehicle for reaching
practices based on implicit bias instead of reconfiguring the disparate treatment
equal pay claim as advocated here. Without in any way dismissing disparate
impact as a viable theory for challenging pay inequality, I believe that disparate
treatment is the better approach for claims challenging unequal pay for substantially similar work and that the claim should still code as disparate treatment
even after incorporating business justification scrutiny into the FOTS.
At the outset, in thinking about the viability of disparate impact theory for
pay, it bears remembering that the doctrinal hurdles to disparate impact in this
area are substantial. A disparate impact claim would have to be brought under
Title VII alone, and not the EPA, and Title VII's amenability to using disparate

between the jobs, not the comparators themselves) and Hein v. Or Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 915-16
(9th Cir. 1983) (same).
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impact is complicated by the Bennett Amendment, which incorporated the
FOTS defense into Title VII sex-based pay discrimination claims. A broad
reading of this amendment would view it as effectively rejecting disparate
impact challenges to facially neutral practices with a disparate impact on
women's pay because the FOTS defense permits pay disparities that are justified
by sex-neutral criteria. The proposal advocated here, incorporating a business
justification test into the FOTS defense, should alleviate this objection. If the
FOTS defense permits pay disparities only when based on sex-neutral criteria
that can withstand business necessity scrutiny, the defense could be reconciled
with the availability of disparate impact pay claims. But this change would not
overcome other more daunting doctrinal hurdles. The FOTS defense would
come into play only after the plaintiff established that a particular employment
practice had a disparate impact on women's pay. This has been a challenge in
disparate impact pay cases. 2 3 7 For pay disparities that courts attribute to market
forces, the overarching structure of the workplace, or choices and characteristics
that are presumed to be internal to women and within their control, disparate
impact doctrine will likely not succeed.2 38 Most likely, courts will continue to
balk at permitting disparate impact pay claims for the same reasons that they
have been hostile to claims sounding in comparable worth.23 9 Indeed, the Court
in Wal-Mart was notably hostile to the disparate impact theory, refusing to see
any particular employment policy or practice at issue in the impact claim,
despite the plaintiffs' proof that the company-wide discretionary pay-setting
practices had a disparate impact on women's pay. 2 4 0
Even if the doctrinal thicket could be cleared to make disparate impact
challenges more effective in pay cases, framing the demand for equal pay as a
disparate treatment claim best engages the heart of the battle over pay equality.
Critics who deny the significance of pay discrimination ground their skepticism

237. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (holding that, in ADEA disparate
impact pay challenge, plaintiffs failed to identity a particular employment practice causing the alleged
pay disparity, despite plaintiffs' allegation that defendant used practice of benchmarking officers' pay to
other nearby police forces); see also Chamallas, supra note 229, at 609 (discussing courts' resistance to
treating complex pay-setting systems as particular employment practices subject to disparate impact
law); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination
Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 36-46, 77-91 (2005) (discussing courts' reluctance to treat organizational systems and structures as particular practices subject to disparate impact challenge).
238. See Travis, supra note 210, at 910-11 (discussing how causal narratives attributing gender pay
gaps to women's choices, market forces, and gender differences in negotiating have derailed disparate
impact pay claims).
239. See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 188, at 39-40 (discussing lower courts' gutting of disparate
impact claims to challenge pay disparities and their refusal to find employers' payment of a "general"
market rate to be a specific employment practice subject to disparate impact challenge); Eisenberg,
supra note 200, at 259 (concluding that despite sounding "powerful in theory," disparate impact for pay
claims "has been less potent in practice").
240. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355-59 (2011) (holding that plaintiffs failed to
identify a particular employment practice causing the pay disparity and explaining that disparate impact
doctrine does not permit plaintiffs to merely show a pay disparity, nor is alleging a policy of allowing
unchecked managerial discretion in setting pay a sufficiently specific employment practice).
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in assumptions about women's choices. They claim that the gender wage gap is
not the product of discrimination, but of women's own selection of lower
paying career tracks and/or decisions to pull back from the labor market. 2 4 1 By
conceding the neutrality of the challenged practices that disparately affect
women's pay, disparate impact does not resist this framing of the reasons why
women earn less; nor does it question the neutrality of the market as a reason
for paying women less the way a disparate treatment claim does.
The hybrid disparate treatment claim endorsed here, which would tighten the
FOTS defense by incorporating a business necessity test, can better challenge
the gender ideologies behind paying women less for equal work by scrutinizing
the strength of the employer's justification for burdening women. Although
testing the strength of the employer's reasons admittedly brings the disparate treatment claim one step closer to disparate impact, it still homes in on the
different treatment of men and women instead of conceding the neutrality of the
market and other explanations for paying women less. When women and men
are paid differently for performing the same work, there is a distinctively
non-neutral pay structure at work, more so than for other neutrally-framed
practices with a disparate impact, such as paying part-time workers lower
pro-rated rates than full-time employees or paying a premium for prior experience in an industry that includes fewer women. This is not to suggest that
disparate impact is not a potentially viable strategy for challenging sex-neutral
pay practices that contribute to the gender wage gap. My claim is more modest:
for challenges to women's unequal pay that can be fashioned as disparate
treatment claims, there are advantages to using disparate treatment rather than
disparate impact as the vehicle of choice, and those advantages persist even
with the retooled disparate treatment-by-way-of-impact model.
CONCLUSION

Legal scholars are currently engaged in an important debate about the
possibilities for using employment discrimination law to address implicit bias
and the normative case for doing so. 2 4 2 Rather than wade into that debate at the
global level, this Article has identified two areas of employment discrimination
law that are primed for using disparate treatment claims to reach beyond
conscious discriminatory intent and into the realm of implicit bias. The PDA has

241. See Schultz, supra note 157, at 1010-11.
242. Compare Bartlett, supra note 49, at 1924-30 (arguing against a de-emphasis on conscious
discriminatory intent), and Wax, supra note 49, at 1226 (arguing against expanding discrimination law
to reach implicit bias), with Bagenstos, supra note 49, at 480 (descriptive reading and normative
defense of the law's coverage of implicit bias), and Selmi, supra note 49 (critiquing Professor Wax's
argument on implicit bias). For efforts to restructure employment discrimination to incentivize the
adoption of de-biasing strategies to minimize implicit bias, see generally Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Struc-

turalApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001).
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already taken this path thanks to the Court's decision in Young.2 4 3 The equal pay
claim is now poised to move in a similar direction, through judicial construction, as some lower courts apply closer scrutiny to the reasons behind a pay
differential and possibly through legislative action that would codify such
scrutiny in the proposed PFA. In both pregnancy and pay, the path to reaching
implicit bias is paved by the use of unjustified impact to infer bias in a disparate
treatment claim.
Pregnancy and pay are particularly auspicious places in the law for such a
shift to take place for two reasons. First, both claims rely on the unequal
treatment of a circumscribed class of comparators to prove discrimination.
Although all disparate treatment claims fundamentally involve unequal treatment based on a protected class status, and the different treatment of comparators is a commonly required element of proving discrimination, the PDA and
equal pay claims specifically delineate the class of relevant comparators whose
differential treatment establishes disparate treatment. For pregnancy, the comparator class is defined as persons with other medical conditions that similarly limit
the ability to work; for pay, it is persons of the other sex who are paid more to
do substantially the same job. With the relevant class of comparators specified,
these claims are less vulnerable to strict rules requiring that comparators also be
similar on additional nonspecified dimensions. Requiring near-perfect similarity
of comparators derails the baseline for finding differential treatment, which is
the entry point for determining whether the reason for different treatment can be
justified. The structure of the comparator-driven model in both pregnancy and
equal pay claims is particularly hospitable to the unjustified impact move
because these claims define the relevant terms on which comparators must be
similar.
Second, both pregnancy and pay discrimination have been the subject of
social activism and heightened public attention. The shape that discrimination
law takes depends on the strength of social norms and popular beliefs about the
prevalence and wrongfulness of discrimination. 2 " In the case of the PDA,
concerted activism around pregnant workers' rights raised the profile of this
issue, generating heightened public concern over the unjust treatment of pregnant workers. Similarly, recent years have seen a resurgence of political advocacy and grassroots mobilization around the issue of equal pay for equal work,
suggesting that a similar moment is at hand for equal pay claims. Although
activists' efforts have moved the dial on public support for the antidiscrimination project in these two areas, the populist case for using employment discrimination law more broadly to root out implicit bias in the workplace is still being
made.24 5
243. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
244. See Schultz, supra note 157, at 1003 (discussing the significance of women's rights activism in
strengthening and broadening sex discrimination law).
245. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 751-52 (noting that second-generation structural theories of
discrimination have "not achieved the same popular traction" as first-generation claims).
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Although the unjustified impact analysis now taking hold in pregnancy and
equal pay claims is borrowed from disparate impact doctrine, this Article still
locates these claims on the disparate treatment side of the divide. Retaining the
disparate treatment label is important for reasons beyond the doctrinal rules that
accompany the categories. How doctrine is fashioned matters not just for its
effect on litigation, but also for how it interacts with the social movements and
politics surrounding discrimination.24 6 Disparate treatment most easily connects
with the social and judicial understandings of what discrimination is and the
normative case for prohibiting it. 24 7 The beauty of the disparate treatment claim
is that it does not concede the neutrality of the practice being challenged.
Through pregnancy and pay disparate treatment claims, pregnant workers and
lower-paid women can challenge the non-neutrality behind their employers'
unfavorable treatment of them, even if that treatment is the product of unconscious bias and stereotyping instead of a deliberate intent to disfavor them as
women. These claims enable plaintiffs to contest the employer's assertion that it
acted neutrally by relying on a reason other than pregnancy to favor another
class of workers or "the market" to pay a woman less for doing equal work.
Framing these claims as disparate treatment claims, even when softened around
the edges so that unjustified impact is used to tease out the inference of
discriminatory intent, produces a distinct set of meanings and symbols. The
disparate impact claim, on the other hand, concedes employer neutrality and
focuses on the happenstance of harm.248 This is not to concede a lack of
normative justification for disparate impact theory. My point is more modest:
between the two theories, the disparate treatment claim resonates more strongly
with society's understanding of discrimination and offers the most promising
frame for contesting the non-neutrality behind employer practices that treat
pregnant workers worse than similarly situated others and pay women less to do
the same job as men.
One possible objection to retaining the disparate treatment moniker in refashioning pregnancy and pay claims to better capture unconscious bias is that the
shift away from conscious discriminatory intent as the touchstone for disparate
treatment dilutes the moral justification for it as a theory of discrimination. As
Charles Sullivan has pointed out, broadening disparate treatment to reach
implicit bias tempers the moral outrage that disparate treatment claims engender: an employer is viewed as less morally blameworthy if it unintentionally

246. MCCANN, supra note 188, passim (discussing the symbolic capital of antidiscrimination doctrine and describing rights-claiming as a social practice that enables social activists to draw on legal
resources in advocacy with legislatures and employers).
247. See Selmi, supra note 44, at 200 (discussing the challenges in gaining public support for the
disparate impact model and stating that "in the United States, as a matter of policy, we are committed to
remedying discrimination, not inequality").
248. Cf. Selmi, supra note 66, at 767-82 (arguing that disparate impact as a theory of discrimination
never succeeded in mobilizing public support behind it and never crossed over from a legal theory to a
social justice rallying cry).
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and unknowingly discriminated than if it acted with conscious animus or a
deliberate intent to discriminate. 2 4 9 Although the presence of a deliberate
discriminatory intent surely adds to the normative case for privileging disparate
treatment as a theory of discrimination, another key pillar of moral outrage
remains: the unfairness of treating a person differently than similarly situated
peers without justification. This part of the normative pull of the disparate
treatment theory remains even if the discriminator's intent to treat the target
differently operates at an unconscious level.
To illustrate the role of different treatment-as distinct from conscious
intent-in supporting the moral foundation for disparate treatment theory, consider the Black Lives Matter movement. 2 5 0 The strength of the social justice
claim behind this movement does not depend on any assumptions about the
conscious intent of the police officers who take the lives of black persons more
callously than those of whites; joining in the moral outrage over the treatment of
African-Americans in interactions with the police does not require a belief that
the police officers consciously reacted to African-Americans differently than
they would have reacted to white persons under similar circumstances. It is the
different treatment of black persons by the police, consciously or not, that
delivers the moral punch of injustice. On the other hand, the power of the claim
of injustice does depend on the non-neutrality of what the police are doing. At
the core of the injustice is that African-Americans are being treated differently
than a white person would be in the same or similar situation. That is not in any
way to deny that there are also great injustices that accrue from race-neutral
rules with a racial impact. But it is the non-neutrality of police action at the
heart of Black Lives Matter-the singling out of African-Americans for harsher
treatment because they are black-that supports the moral outrage behind the
movement, regardless of whether the discriminatory actions by the police stem
from a conscious racist intent or implicit bias.
Moving the law beyond conscious discriminatory intent to reach discriminatory treatment that stems from implicit bias should not drain the moral reserves
of the disparate treatment claim. Although proof that an employer consciously
acted with intent to discriminate adds to society's moral outrage, it does not
bear the full brunt of it.
Related to the issue of moral outrage is the question of appropriate remedies
for discriminatory treatment that stems from implicit bias rather than a conscious intent to discriminate. One possible objection to retaining the disparate

&

249. Charles A. Sullivan, DisparateImpact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM.
L. REv. 911, 984 (2005).
250. In making this analogy, I do not intend in any way to analogize the Black Lives Matter
movement to the movement for equal pay or pregnant workers' rights or make any broader point about
the equivalency of these issues. Rather, my point in referencing this distinctive social movement is to
illustrate that the moral salience of discriminatory treatment as an injustice does not depend on the
conscious intent of the wrongdoer (here, the police), but is supported by unjustified different treatment
in fact, whether based on a conscious intent or implicit bias.
MARY
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treatment classification for the pregnancy and equal pay claims discussed in this
Article goes to the difference in remedies for disparate treatment and disparate
impact. When Congress added compensatory and punitive damages as remedies
under Title VII, it provided them only for disparate treatment and not for
disparate impact. 2 5 1 That distinction, however, says nothing about how to define
the limits of these categories. As argued above, using unjustified impact to infer
discriminatory intent-even a broader version of intent that encompasses implicit bias-does not necessarily transform these claims from disparate treatment into disparate impact. Moreover, if the moral punch of disparate treatment
retains its power when a protected class is unjustly treated worse than similarly
situated persons, regardless of the consciousness of this bias, then the makewhole relief afforded by compensatory damages is fully supportable.2 52 Punitive
damages, on the other hand, are already limited by the conscious intentions of
the employer. The Supreme Court has limited punitive damages in Title VII
cases to employers that violate the law recklessly or in bad faith. 25 3 Similarly,
the EPA reserves its strongest financial penalty for willful violations of the
Act.2 54 As a result, retaining the disparate treatment designation would allow for
compensatory awards that remedy the harm of the differential treatment, but
would require some further showing of intentionality to support more punitive
forms of relief. This calibration of remedies corresponds nicely to the added
societal outrage that attaches to the deliberate discriminator.
Because the bulk of the Article explains how the newly revitalized PDA
claim blurs the boundary between treatment and impact claims, and advocates
for a parallel development in equal pay claims, it may seem odd to end on an
argument about the relative superiority of disparate treatment over disparate
impact as the preferable doctrine for housing these claims. But although Young
teaches that the treatment and impact categories are blurrier around the edges
than the Court's case law admits, these categories continue to structure courts'
approaches to discrimination cases. They also shape the politics of antidiscrimination law and the social justice claims surrounding them. The core lesson from
Young is that elements of the impact claim can be a useful tool for proving
discrimination within a disparate treatment framework, not that the categories
themselves have collapsed. By permitting proof of unjustified impact to support
an inference of discrimination, the Young decision has broadened the disparate

251. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (authorizing compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII "against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)," subject to
limitations based on the employer's size).
252. Cf Selmi, supra note 44, at 216-18 (arguing that it is a "mistake . . to treat implicit bias as
beyond one's control" and summarizing research on interventions to prevent and correct for unconscious bias).
253. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1999).
254. The EPA does not authorize damages per se; employees may recover only their unpaid wages
and an amount equal to that sum in liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The statute has a two-year
statute of limitations generally, but a three-year recovery period for willful violations. Id. § 255(a).
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treatment claim in a way that makes it better suited to reach the unconscious
stereotyping and implicit bias that underlie employer policies to treat pregnant
women less favorably than other workers. A similar structure holds promise for
equal pay claims. Although drawing on impact elements in this way expands the
traditional model for proving disparate treatment, there is still value in conceptualizing these claims as disparate treatment. For both the pregnancy and pay
claims, the heart of the challenge centers on the unjust different treatment of the
plaintiff-class. As a social justice claim, this strikes a chord on a different
register than challenges to neutral practices with disproportionate effects.

